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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction lo rc\ iew I Ins appeal from the 
judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, 
dated August 3,2004, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) (Supreme Court 
authority to transfer case to Ct. of App.) and 78-2a-3(J) (jurisdiction over cases 
transferred by Supreme Ct.). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following is a verbatim presentation of issues presented by Appellants 
(hereafter, "Gedo") in Gedo's brief. Following each issue statement, Appellees 
(hereafter, "Sudweeks") present the applicable standard of review. 
ISSUE NO. 1. "Whether the trial court erred by allowing Appellees to commence 
this action alleging 5 (five) causes of action, to wit: 
(a) Boundary by acquiescence. 
(b) Prescriptive easement. 
(c) Trespass by Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo, and Maria Angelica Sanchez. 
(d) Forcible detainer by David Gedo, James Gedo, and Maria Angelica Sanchez. 
(e) Injunction;" 
Standard of Review. As presented, this issue appears to suggest that the trial court 
should not have permitted Appellees to file their complaint with five causes of action 
related to ownership and control of real property in dispute. The statement thus presents 
a threshold question of the Sudweeks' right of access to the court, and secondly, a 
question of the trial court's discretion in dismissing claims. 
Art. 1. § 11, Utah Constitution guarantees every person the right to a remedy by 
due course of law. Constitutional challenges to the application of statues constitute 
questions of law which the appellate court reviews for correctness. Colosmio v. Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 104 P.3d 646, 651 (Ut. App. 2004). 
Dismissal of actions in the trial court is governed under Utah R. Civ. P. 41. A trial 
court's decision as to dismissal of claims for either lack of standing, jurisdiction or 
content, as broadly articulated in Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b), is subjected to a de novo review 
on appeal. 
This issue was not preserved in the trial court, Gedo filed an answer to the subject 
complaint on June 4, 2001 wherein Gedo denied the "substantial allegations" and 
thereafter alleged counter-suit on a variety of claims including attempted theft, 
conspiracy, assault and impersonation of an officer. (Gedo Brief, Addendum #5) 
ISSUE NO. 2. "Whether the trial court erred when Appellant challenged the 
jurisdiction of the court and made special appearance only to present official muniments 
of ownership sufficient to raise the issues of: 
(a) Show there were no issues of title, or quiet title or boundary by acquiescence or 
prescriptive easement or trespass or forcible detainer or any other cause of action within 
the jurisdiction of the court relating to this case. 
(b) Show that Appellees allegations and claims against Appellant failed to be 
factually and legally sufficient to show justiciability of the issues between them and the 
subject parcel to this action. 
(c) Show lack of sufficient personal interest on the part of Appellees to confer 
standing to prosecute any claim against these Appellants. 
(d) Show the absence of any private right of action in favor of Appellees. 
(e) Show a proper basis for Appellees to accuse Appellant for contempt of the 
court and impose summary incarceration of Appellants due to non-adjudicated claim that 
Appellants committed crime against Appellees as a contempt of the trial court. 
(f) Show that Appellees allegations and claims against Appellant were factually 
and legally insufficient to show that Appellants had violated mandatory state law 
governing the protection of, ownership of, use of and possession of private real estate." 
Standard of Review. As presented, this issue implies the improper exercise of 
jurisdiction; either subject matter or personal. Questions as to whether a court has subject 
matter jurisdiction are questions of law which the Court reviews for correctness, 
according no deference to the trial court's determination. Beaver County v. Quest, Inc., 
31 P.3d 1147, 1149 (UT 2001) 
According to trial court documents filed and in the Sudweeks' possession, this 
issue was not preserved in the trial court. No limited or special appearance was provided 
to the Sudweeks counsel. Gedo filed an answer to the Sudweeks complaint on June 4, 
2001. 
ISSUE NO. 3. "Whether the trial court erred by failing to properly consider 
Appellants timely Notice that the principles of laches precludes Appellee from bringing 
this action due to Appellees unreasonable delay and negligence in pursuing Appellees 
claim." 
Standard of Review. This issue, as presented, appears to raise either a question of 
fact as to whether an affirmative defense was timely asserted, or a question of law as 
whether the trial court properly applied the law to facts presented. Questions of fact are 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, with deference given to the trial court. Platts 
v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (UT 1997). The trial court's application of 
law to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. Actions or events relating to 
waiver are factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which 
the appellate court gives a district court deference. Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572 
(UT 1999). 
This issue was not preserved in the trial court. Sudweeks can find no presentation 
of an affirmative defense by Gedo. Gedo answered Sudweeks' complaint on June 4, 
2001. Said answer contained no affirmative defenses or mention of "laches" but rather, 
requested a trial setting at the soonest possible date. (Gedo Brief, Addendum #5) 
ISSUE NO. 4. "Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellants' motion to 
dismiss and denied Appellant's request for declaratory judgment and summary judgment 
against Appellee based upon Appellants officially recorded muniments of ownership, and 
records of tax payments and presumptions of possession and ownership according to 
Utah Code and based upon Appellants official survey plat map, all of which are 
redundantly dispositive of Appellees claims against Appellants." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue raises a question of law with regard to a 
motion to dismiss, as well as issues of law related to summary judgment. A trial court's 
ruling on a motion to dismiss is a question of law, reviewed for correctness, with no 
deference to the district court's ruling. State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). No appeal lies from denial of summary judgment (Utah R. Civ. P. rule 56) 
however, a court's denial of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness, with no 
deference to the trial court's determinations. Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 116 
P.3d323,331(UT2005). 
This issue was not specifically preserved in the trial court by any filing or written 
objection to the court's order. Moreover, no motions matching the description provided 
were supplied to Sudweeks, and neither are believed to be part of any court proceeding in 
this matter. 
ISSUE NO. 5. "Whether the trial court erred by allowing Appellees (sic) attorney 
to fail to respond to many official documents and issues properly interjected by Appellant 
into this case and which established justiciable issues and requests for the court to rule 
upon." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue appears to present a question as to the 
trial court's conduct and handling of discovery, hearings and other aspects of litigation— 
and papers which may or may not have been properly presented by Gedo in the process. 
A trial court judge's rulings related to management of a case are not disturbed unless they 
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and prejudice the objecting party. Hanks v. 
Christensen, 354 P.2d 564 (UT 1960). 
This issue was not preserved in the trial court by any filing in Sudweeks' 
possession, nor do Sudweeks possess any document to which the "issue" might refer. 
ISSUE NO. 6. "Whether the trial court Judge Hansen erred by issuing a 
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, when and while the court 
failed to require Appellee to provide the court with verifiable articulable probable cause 
in support of Appellees (sic) motion for temporary restraining order." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue raises the question of the trial court 
judge's ruling on facts presented in favor of injunctive relief. On appellate review, a 
grant of injunction is overturned only upon showing that the district court abused its 
discretion or that the decision is clearly against the weight of the evidence. Strawberry 
Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 881 (UT 1996). 
This issue is believed to have been preserved in the trial court inasmuch as the 
issue of injunctive relief for the Sudweeks was presented to the trial court, with an 
opportunity for ruling. 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat Inc., 99 P.3d 801 (UT 2004). 
ISSUE NO. 7. "Whether the Court erred by committing unlawful actions of 
issuing an injunction when and while Appellee failed to show then and now can not show 
any proper evidence of ownership." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue appears to question the trial court's 
ruling on a motion for injunctive relief. Rulings on injunction motions are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion and will only be overturned if there is a showing that the district court 
abused its discretion or that the decision is clearly against the weight of the evidence. 
Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 881 (UT 1996). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court inasmuch as the issue of injunctive relief 
for Sudweeks was presented to the trial court, with an opportunity for ruling. 438 Main 
St. v. Easy Heat Inc., 99 P.3d 801 (UT 2004). 
ISSUE NO. 8. "Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellants (sic) 
motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Appellees 
when and while Appellants had then and have now all of the official muniments of 
ownership pertaining to the subject parcel." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue appears to question the trial court's 
ruling on a motion for injunctive relief. Rulings on injunction motions are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion and will only be overturned if there is a showing that the district court 
abused its discretion or that the decision is clearly against the weight of the evidence. 
Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 881 (UT 1996). 
This issue is believed to have been preserved in the trial court inasmuch as the 
issue of injunctive relief for Sudweeks was presented to the trial court, with an 
opportunity for ruling. 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat Inc., 99 P.3d 801 (UT 2004). 
ISSUE NO. 9. "Whether the trial court erred when it allowed Appellees (sic) 
attorney, Judge Taylor and the State of Utah Fourth District Court personnel tampering 
with the State of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure process and the U.S. Postal Service 
system, all of which resulted in numerous official failures to timely notify Appellant of 
crucial, indispensable hearings, documents, litigation and other information pertinent to 
this case, all of which are required by law to be noticed to Appellant affirmatively 
throughout this action." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue suggests the judicial mishandling of 
procedural requirements. The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of 
law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Spry, 21 P.3d 675 (Ut. App. 2001). A trial 
court judge's rulings related to management of a case are not disturbed unless they are 
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and prejudice the objecting party. Hanks v. 
Christensen, 354 P.2d 564 (UT 1960). 
This issue was not preserved in the trial court by any filing properly served upon 
the Sudweeks. 
ISSUES NO. 10. "Whether the trial court erred when on June 19, 2003, Appellee 
scheduled pretrial conference ex parte for change of judge from Judge Hansen, Division 7 
Civil, to Judge Taylor, Division 1 Criminal Felony in violation of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 63 A Change of judge as a matter of right." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue calls into question procedural matters 
having to do with a change of the judge assigned in the trial court. The proper 
interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Spry, 21 P.3d 675 (Ut. App. 2001). A trial court judge's rulings related to 
management of a case are not disturbed unless they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable 
and prejudice the objecting party. Hanks v. Christensen, 354 P.2d 564 (UT 1960). 
This issue was not preserved in the trial court by any document filed in the trial 
court and in the possession of the Sudweeks. 
ISSUE NO. 11. "Whether the trial court erred by conducting ex parte hearings 
with Judge Taylor and Appellee, which resulted in (sic) summary deprivation of 
Appellants (sic) civil rights by Appellee and Judge Taylor court." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue presents accusations of judicial 
misconduct. The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law and is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Spry, 21 P.3d 675 (Ut. App. 2001). A trial court 
judge's rulings related to management of a case are not disturbed unless they are clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable and prejudice the objecting party. Hanks v. Christensen, 354 
P.2d 564 (UT 1960). 
This issue was not preserved in any document filed and in the possession of the 
Sudweeks. 
ISSUE NO. 12. "Whether the trial court erred by allowing the complaint to be 
materially changed by Appellee and the trial court ex parte." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue calls into question the matters of civil 
procedure in the trial court's administration of the case. The proper interpretation of a 
rule of procedure is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Spry, 21 
P.3d 675 (Ut. App. 2001). A trial court judge's rulings related to management of a case 
are not disturbed unless they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and prejudice the 
objecting party. Hanks v. Christensen, 354 P.2d 564 (UT 1960). Furthermore, whether to 
grant or deny a motion to amend is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial court 
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the appealing party established an abuse of 
discretion resulting in prejudice. Pride Stables v. Homestead Golf Club, Inc., 82 P.3d 198 
(Ut App. 2003). 
This issue was not preserved in the trial court by any document filed with the court 
and in the Sudweeks' possession. 
ISSUE NO. 13. "Whether the reviewing judge erred by denying Appellants (sic) 
motion for Change of Judge under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 63(b)." 
Standard of Review. As stated this issue raises a question of judicial 
administration of the case below. A trial court judge's rulings related to management of a 
case are not disturbed unless they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and prejudice the 
objecting party. Hanks v. Christensen, 354 P.2d 564 (UT 1960). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by virtue of Gedo filing a Request for 
Change of Judge, thus presenting the issue for the court's consideration and ruling. 
ISSUE NO. 14. "Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellants (sic) timely 
request for Jury Trial." 
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of fact as to the timeliness of 
the request for jury trial and a question of law as to the trial court's application of law to 
facts. Questions of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, with deference 
given to the trial court. Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (UT 1997). 
The trial court's application of law to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 
This issue was not preserved in the trial court by virtue of Gedo making the 
request and thus presenting the issue for the court's consideration and ruling. 
ISSUE NO. 15. "Whether the trial court erred when it allowed the Appellee at trial 
for this case, to enter into evidence, over appellant's instant, timely and proper objection, 
an unofficial criminal simulation plat map and which that said objection immediately sent 
Appellant to jail summarily." 
Standard of Review. This issue, as stated, calls into question the trial court's 
handling of evidence. The admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law 
reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. Chen v. Stewart, 123 P.3d 
416, 425 (UT 2005); also, State v. Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165 (UT 2003); State v. Whittle, 
989P.2d52(UT1999). 
This issue may have been preserved in the trial court by Gedo's filing of a 
"Demand to Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction and Litigation Fees" wherein Gedo 
challenged the authenticity and reliability of Sudweeks evidence and accused the trial 
court of rejecting Gedo's proffer of evidence. (Gedo Brief, Addendum #5) 
ISSUE NO. 16. "Whether the trial court erred when it allowed presentation by 
official surveyor John B. Stahl of an unrecorded plat map as evidence of Appellees 
ownership of the subject parcel, and which said criminal simulation plat map has not to 
this day been recorded at the Utah County Recorders office." 
Standard of Review. This issue, as stated, appears to be redundant to the 
previously-stated issue, and calls into question the trial court's handling of evidence. The 
admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law reviewed on appeal under an 
abuse of discretion standard. Chen v. Stewart, 123 P.3d 416, 425 (UT 2005); also, State 
v. Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165 (UT 2003); State v. Whittle, 989 P.2d 52 (UT 1999). 
This issue may have been preserved in the trial court by Gedo's filing of a 
"Demand to Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction and Litigation Fees" wherein Gedo 
challenged the authenticity and reliability of Sudweeks evidence and accused the trial 
court of rejecting Gedo's proffer of evidence. (Gedo Brief, Addendum #5) 
ISSUE NO. 17. "Whether the trial court erred by dismissing at the conclusion of 
trial all of Appellees (sic) original claims that were used by Appellee as justification for 
the issuance under oath, of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and 
(sic) quieted Appellants (sic) title to the parcel to Appellees." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue calls into question the substance of the 
trial court's final legal conclusions and order. The trial court's factual findings are 
reviewed for clear error and its legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Hilton, 121 
P.3d 42, 46 (UT 2005); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (UT 1998). 
This issue may have been preserved in the trial court, to the extent that Gedo's 
filing of a notice of appeal could preserve issues related to final orders —but it was not 
presented to the Sudweeks prior to Gedo's initial brief, as it was not mentioned in the 
Gedo Docketing Statement. 
ISSUE NO. 18. "Whether the trial court erred by failing in the final order to direct 
Appellants to deliver the warranty deed or other documents to Appellee as required by 
Utah Code, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 70, Judgment for specific acts; vesting 
title, and thereby properly resulting in nullification of all the court judgment and orders in 
this case." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue appears to raise questions as to the 
sufficiency of the trial court's final order. A trial court's factual findings are reviewed for 
clear error and its legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Hilton, 121 P.3d 42, 46 (UT 
2005); Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (UT 1998). 
This issue may have been preserved in the trial court, to the extent that Gedo's 
filing of a notice of appeal could preserve issues related to final orders—but it was not 
presented to the Sudweeks prior to Gedo's initial brief, as it was not mentioned in the 
Gedo Docketing Statement. 
ISSUE NO. 19. "Whether the trial court erred by failing to require Appellees to 
prepare the final order within the time limits of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 5 8A. 
(d) Entry, and Rule 5, Service." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue appears to raise a question as to the trial 
court's application of procedural rules and a question of fact as to timeliness of the final 
order. Questions of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, with deference 
given to the trial court. Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (UT 1997). 
The trial court's application of law to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. The 
proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Spry, 21 P.3d 675 (Ut. App. 2001). 
This issue may have been preserved in the trial court, to the extent that Gedo's 
filing of a notice of appeal could preserve issues related to final orders—but it was not 
presented to the Sudweeks prior to Gedo's initial brief, as it was not mentioned in the 
Gedo Docketing Statement. 
ISSUE NO. 20. "Whether the trial court erred when months after trial and without 
proper notice to Appellant, Judge Taylor peremptorily signed and mailed copy of the 
final order in this case to (sic) Appellants several year old officially superceded address 
in a blatant attempt to deprive Appellants of their right of appeal, and post judgment 
remedies." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue appears to raise a question as to the trial 
court's application of procedural rules and a question of fact as to timeliness of the 
signing and mailing of the final order. Questions of fact are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard, with deference given to the trial court. Platts v. Parents Helping 
Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (UT 1997). The trial court's application of law to the facts is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a 
question of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Spry, 21 P.3d 675 (Ut. App. 
2001). 
This issue may have been preserved in the trial court, to the extent that Gedo's 
filing of a notice of appeal could preserve issues related to final orders—but it was not 
presented to the Sudweeks prior to Gedo's initial brief, as it was not mentioned in the 
Gedo Docketing Statement. 
ISSUE NO. 21. "Whether the Court erred when, as shown by Court records, the 
court (sic) failed to send Appellant copy of the final order in violation of Appellants right 
to due process, notice and opportunity to defend with post judgment remedies and to 
legally challenge the trial court final orders in this case." 
Standard of Review. As stated, this issue raises a question of civil procedure post-
judgment. The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law and is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Spry, 21 P.3d 675 (Ut. App. 2001). Questions of fact 
as to the timeliness of mailing or circumstances surrounding that process would be 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, with deference given to the trial court. Platts 
v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (UT 1997). 
This issue may have been preserved in the trial court, to the extent that Gedo's 
filing of a notice of appeal could preserve issues related to final orders—but it was not 
presented to the Sudweeks prior to Gedo's initial brief, as it was not mentioned in the 
Gedo Docketing Statement. 
ISSUE NO. 22. "Whether the court erred by denying Appellant the protection of 
the due process clauses included in all three of the United States of America Constitution, 
the State of Utah Constitution and the Utah Code Annotated Rules of Civil Procedure and 
other holdings in the Utah Code, and all of which are specifically constructed to insure, 
simplify and expedite the resolution of frivolous lawsuits from escalation from one 15 
(fifteen) minute pretrial hearing to a case that has lasted 4 (four) years wherein 
Appellants have been subjected to involuntary servitude of being deprived of officially 
recorded real property and forced to litigate against professional attorneys without the 
assistance of counsel to protect and defend their officially owned realty, and continues to 
this very day." 
Standard of Review. As stated by Gedo, this issue implies a question of due 
process violations arising from the redundant challenge to the trial court's management of 
the case below. Constitutional challenges to the application of statues constitute questions 
of law which the appellate court reviews for correctness. Colosmio v. Roman Catholic 
Bishop of Salt Lake City, 104 P.3d 646, 651 (Ut. App. 2004). The proper interpretation 
of a rule of procedure is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Spry, 
21P.3d675(Ut.App.2001). 
This issue was not specifically preserved in the trial court by any document filed 
with the court and in the Sudweeks' possession. It is noted, however, that among the 
allegations raised in Gedo's "Demand to Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction and 
Litigation Fees" and Gedo's "Request to Change Judge" are references to the deprivation 
of Constitutional rights. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
The full text of cited provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations is included in 
Exhibit "A" of the Addendum hereto. 
1. United States Constitution, 1st Amendment (right to petition for redress) 
2. United States Constitution, 14 Amendment (due process) 
3. Utah Constitution, Art. 1. § 11 (right to a remedy by due course of law) 
4. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
a. 5(d) 
b. 10(f) 
c. 12(b) 
d. 38(b) and (d) 
e. 63(b)(c)(2) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Gedo has appealed a final order entitled "Order and Judgment" filed August 3, 
2004 in the Fourth District Court in and for Utah County by Judge James R. Taylor. 
The case arises from conflicting claims of ownership of a 33' wide strip of land 
running South and away from 200 South Street (Battle Creek Drive) in Pleasant Grove, 
Utah at approximately 1610 East (the "disputed property"). The disputed property was 
part of the Sudweeks property description when they purchased two adjoining lots at 200 
South, 1610 East, Pleasant Grove, Utah in 1972. From the time of their purchase, the 
Sudweeks treated the land in all respects as belonging to them by landscaping, improving 
and using the land—as well as paying taxes assessed for the land. The conflict with 
Gedo (Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Sanchez) began in the spring of 2001, 
29 years after the Sudweeks' purchase. 
Sometime after 1999, Gedo began to occasionally use the strip of land to access 
property Gedo had purchased South and East of the Sudweeks property. Noting the Gedo 
intrusion, Sudweeks filed an action May 10, 2001 in the Fourth District Court in Provo, 
Utah, seeking to quiet title to the 33' strip of property. Summons and complaint were 
served upon Gedo May 18, 2001 and a hand-written answer to the complaint was filed 
June 4, 2001. 
In reaction to the Sudweeks complaint, Gedo parked a wrecking truck directly in 
front of Sudweeks' motor home which was parked on the strip of land. The positioning 
of Gedo's wrecking truck preventing use or movement of the motor home. On or about 
July 2, 2001, James and Miguel Gedo threatened John Sudweeks' health and safety and 
that of his wife and family. A temporary restraining order was issued and then, after a 
hearing on the matter, in which the Gedo defendants were present and heard, Judge 
Hansen subsequently converted the TRO to a Preliminary Injunction against David and 
James Gedo. 
Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below 
By motion the Sudweeks were permitted to amend their complaint in 2003 to add 
causes of action for boundary by acquiescence and prescriptive easement. 
Trial took place December 15 and 16, 2003. During opening statements, David 
Gedo ignored the court's repeated direction to be quiet and wait his turn and was 
eventually found in contempt and temporarily incarcerated. He was then permitted to re-
enter the court room to continue the trial, on his promise to be quiet and wait his turn. 
All the evidence relied upon in the Court's findings and ruling was presented after all 
Defendants were again present in the court, with opportunity to examine and cross-
examine witnesses. 
In its final Order and Judgment entered August 3,2004, the trial court found that 
based on the evidence presented by Sudweeks and their witnesses, the 33' wide strip of 
land did not validly exist and the county maps indicating its existence were in error. The 
Court found that a mistaken description in a neighboring lot, made years earlier, had been 
propagated into descriptions for the Sudweeks' lots, resulting in a gap 33' wide that the 
Utah County Recorder's office had shown, at various times, in various places on maps. 
With chain of title research on all affected lots, and a comprehensive survey of the 
same, a corrected property description was drafted which, when compared to existing, 
historic fence lines and markers, exactly fit those indicia for the two lots purchased by 
Sudweeks in 1972, and for each of the neighboring lots as well. 
Based on these findings, the court quieted title to the disputed 33' wide parcel in 
Sudweeks. The court then dismissed alternative claims by Sudweeks for boundary by 
acquiescence and prescriptive easement as unnecessary or moot. By Sudweeks' own 
motion, the court then dismissed the forcible detainer action. Finally, finding that Gedo 
claimed rightful use of the disputed parcel, the court dismissed Sudweeks' trespass claim. 
The court then proceeded to find that Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo had 
violated the Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction entered by the 
court in September 2001 by placing threatening telephone calls to Sudweeks on or about 
June 24 and June 26, 2003. The court therefore found David and James Gedo in 
contempt and granted Sudweeks a permanent injunction, restraining Gedo from using, 
occupying or trespassing on the Sudweeks' property, including the disputed parcel, and 
from having any contact with Sudweeks or Sudweeks' family members, and then 
awarded attorney fees and costs of $14,182.70 to be paid by the two Defendants found in 
contempt. 
Prior to the trial court signing its final order, Gedo had filed a notice of appeal 
January 9, 2004 and then an attempted "Docketing Statement" on March 19, 2004 and a 
transcript request April 26, 2004. The Court of Appeals, on a sua sponte Motion for 
Summary Disposition filed April 2, 2004, called for memoranda from Gedo and 
Sudweeks as to whether or not the Gedo appeal filed January 9, 2004 should be dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals declined to exercise jurisdiction and 
dismissed the first Gedo appeal June 17, 2004. 
Upon presentation of an affidavit of attorney fees and costs to the trial court, the 
trial court, Judge James Taylor, entered Order and Judgment as a final order in the case 
on August 3, 2004. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is noted that Rule 24, Utah R. App. P. requires as part of the Statement of Facts, 
references to proceedings below as cited in the record of the case. As the appellate court 
record shows, Gedo first failed to request a transcript under Rule 11, Ut. R. App. P., and 
then failed to submit a statement of evidence as required under Rule 11(g), Ut. R. App. P. 
Since no record is available from the trial court, the parties are left to provide a "record" 
based on filings in the trial court. These material documents are included herein as 
exhibits in the Addendum. 
1. The disputed property is a 33' wide strip of property located on the Eastern 
edge of Sudweeks' property in Pleasant Grove, Utah. (Amended Complaint, f^l[ 3-9, 
Exhibit "B", Addendum.) 
2. Gedo consists of three individuals (Maria Angelica Sanchez, Migel David 
Gedo and James Gedo) residing in Utah County, Utah. (Complaint, Tf 2, Exhibit "C", 
Addendum.) 
3. Sudweeks consists of two individuals (John and Deanna Sudweeks) who 
are husband and wife, residing at 1610 East 200 South, Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062. 
(Complaint, ^ 1, Exhibit "C", Addendum.) 
4. Sudweeks own two adjoining parcels of real property in Pleasant Grove 
City, Utah County, State of Utah, one parcel which is described in the Warranty Deed 
from Joseph Best and Elainne P. Best to Plaintiffs, dated June 21, 1972, and recorded 
June 22, 1972 as Entry No. 9195, Book 1279 and Page 224 of the Records of the Utah 
County Recorder's Office and the second parcel which is described in the Warranty Deed 
from Boyd M. Collings and Geraldine L. Collings to Sudweeks, dated August 25, 1972 as 
Entry No. 13361, Book 1290 and page 108 of the Records of the Utah County Recorder's 
Office. (Amended Complaint, pp. 1-2, f3; Exhibit "B", Addendum; Lots 5d and 5b, Stahl 
survey/findings, Exhibit "D", Exhibit "O", Addendum.) 
5. Sudweeks have been the sole and exclusive owners of the above described 
parcels since they purchased the same in 1972. (Amended Complaint, pg.2, %4; Exhibit 
"B", Exhibit "O", Addendum.) 
6. Johnny Ray O'Conner and Martha O'Conner are the owners of a parcel of 
real property in Pleasant Grove City, County of Utah , State of Utah ("O'Conner 
Property") which is located directly to the East of Sudweeks' parcels, as referred to in the 
Warranty Deed from Susan S. Hardinger to the O'Conners dated August 10, 1994 as 
Entry No. 64616, Book 3507 and Pages 855 and 856 of the Records of the Utah County 
Recorder's Office. (Amended Complaint, pg.2, [^5; Exhibit "B", Addendum; Lot 2b, 
Stahl survey/findings, Exhibit "D", O'Conner Deed, Exhibit "P", Addendum.) 
7. Gedo claims an ownership interest in real property in Pleasant Grove City 
which is described in the Quit Claim Deed from Miguel David Gedo to Maria Angelica 
Sanchez dated October 8, 2000 and recorded October 19, 2000 as Entry No. 112433, 
Book 5248 and Pages 654-656 of the Records of the Utah County Recorder's Office. 
(Amended Complaint, pg.2, ^|6; Exhibit "B", Addendum; Lot 59, 1978 Utah County Plat, 
NW-NE section 27, township 5 south, range 2 east #14044, 2 of 4, Exhibit "E", Gedo 
Deeds, Exhibit "G", Addendum) 
8. In 1972 the decree of distribution for the estate of Ivadell Tomlinson 
mistakenly located the east line of certain real property in the Tomlinson estate (including 
the Sudweeks property; see lots 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5d, Stahl survey/findings, Exhibit "D", 
Addendum) westward 33 feet from its correct position. (Order and Judgment, pg.2, TJ2; 
Exhibit "F", Addendum; Stahl survey/findings, Exhibit "D", Addendum.) 
9. The Tomlinson estate was subsequently divided into four parcels; lot 5b 
(the eastern most parcel owned by Sudweeks), lot 5d (Sudweeks west parcel), lot 5a 
(adjacent and west of Sudweeks), and lot 5c (adjacent and west of 5a). The legal 
descriptions of the lots perpetuated the error previously described, shifting the legal 
descriptions of each of these properties westward 33 feet. (Order and Judgment, pg.2, |^4; 
Exhibit "F", Addendum; Stahl survey/findings, Exhibit "D", Addendum.) 
10. Modifications were subsequently made to the descriptions of parcels on 
either side of the Tomlinson estate properties (lot 3 and lots 2a, 2b, and 2c, Stahl 
survey/findings, Exhibit "D", Addendum.) 
11. These modifications arose from boundary line agreements, surveys and 
deed exchanges. (Order and Judgment, pg.3, ^ [6; Exhibit "F", Addendum; Stahl 
survey/findings, Exhibit "D", Addendum.) 
12. Even though the boundaries between the Sudweeks' eastern most parcel 
(lot 5b, Stahl Survey, lot 16 on Utah County plat, Exhibit "E", Addendum) and 
O'Conners (lot 2b, Stahl Survey, lot 57 , Utah County Plat, Exhibit "E", Addendum) are 
contiguous, the modifications previously described purported to create a new parcel 33 
feet wide between those two lots. This purported parcel ("disputed property") was 
referred to as lot 59 in the records of the Utah County Recorder. (Order and Judgment, 
pg.3, f7; Exhibit "F", Addendum; Utah County Plat, Exhibit "E", Addendum.) 
13. As a function of the confusion caused by the errant descriptions, the "gap" 
lot was shown at differrent locations at different times, as a comparison of sequential 
county plat maps indicate. (Other County Maps, Exhibit "Q", Addendum.) 
14. The boundary between the O'Conner property and the disputed property is 
marked by a fence and driveway, both of which have been in existence for a long time, 
the fence having been constructed by Sudweeks shortly after Sudweeks' purchase of their 
parcels in 1972. (Amended Complaint, pg.3, [^9; Exhibit "B", Addendum.) 
15. The corresponding boundary line which is marked by the fence and 
driveway has been recognized and treated by the parties and their predecessors in interest 
as the Sudweeks' East boundary since 1972 when the Sudweeks purchased their two 
parcels. (Amended Complaint, pg.3, f^lO; Exhibit "B", Addendum.) 
16. Sudweeks reasonably believed that their property line extended up to the 
fence and driveway line since they purchased their parcels in 1972, and they have 
continued to use and occupy the same since that time, and have planted fruit trees, grass, 
plants, and have laid an asphalt pad on the same. (Amended Complaint, pg.3, ^ |11; 
Exhibit "B", Addendum.) 
17. In 1999 Gedo allegedly purchased the 33' wide parcel appearing as lot 59 
on the Utah County Plat by warranty deed from Alan Strasburg. (Exhibit "G", 
Addendum) 
18. Sudweeks filed an action May 10, 2001 in the Fourth District Court in 
Provo, Utah, seeking to quiet title to the 33' strip of property. (Complaint, Exhibit "C", 
Addendum.) 
19. Summons and complaint were served upon Gedo May 18, 2001 (Exhibit 
"H", (Summons) Addendum) and a hand-written answer to the complaint was filed June 
4, 2001. (Gedo Brief, Addendum #5) 
20. Some time prior to July 2001, Gedo knowingly and intentionally drove a 
wrecking truck upon and did park the same on the Sudweeks' property directly in front of 
Plaintiffs motor home, and between it and the street—thereby depriving Sudweeks of the 
use of their motor home. (Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause, pg.2, 
T[5; Exhibit "I", Addendum.) 
21. Gedo refused to remove the truck when repeatedly requested by Sudweeks, 
claiming title to the disputed property. (Amended Complaint, pg.3, ^ |14; Exhibit "B", 
Addendum.) 
22. On or about July 2, 2001 David and James Gedo approached John 
Sudweeks on his property and threatened his health and safety and that of his wife and 
family. (Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause, pg.2, J^4; Exhibit "I", 
Addendum.) 
23. Sudweeks was granted a Temporary Restraining Order which was 
converted to a Preliminary Injunction after hearing before Judge Hansen, Fourth District 
Court, August 8, 2001. (Order and Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit "J", Addendum.) 
24. On or about June 24, 2003 and June 26, 2003, David and James Gedo 
violated the Temporary Restraining Order by placing threatening telephone calls to 
Sudweeks. (Order and Judgment, p.5, ^|16, Exhibit "F", Addendum.) 
25. Trial was held in the Fourth District Court on December 15th and 16th, 2003 
before Judge James R. Taylor. (Order and Judgment, p.l, Exhibit "F", Addendum.) 
26. A final Order and Judgment was entered by Judge Taylor August 3, 2004, 
wherein he quieted title in the disputed property to Sudweeks, found David and James 
Gedo in contempt for violating the restraining order, granted a permanent injunction 
against Gedos and then awarded attorney fees and costs to be paid by David Gedo and 
James Gedo in the amount of $14,182.70. (Order and Judgment, p.l, Exhibit "F", 
Addendum.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. GEDO FAILED TO MARSHAL ANY EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED 
ON APPEAL. 
While the Gedo brief a constant barrage of sometimes-indecipherable jabs at the 
trial court's factual findings and even the court itself, Gedo ducks the essential appellant 
obligation to: 1) marshal evidence in support of the trial court's findings, and then, 2) 
show that it is insufficient to support or justify the trial court's ruling. This Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court have firmly held that a failure to properly marshal evidence results 
in the appellate court accepting the appellee's factual statements as true. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY QUIETED TITLE IN 
SUDWEEKS. 
The trial court properly quieted title in Sudweeks based upon the only credible 
evidence presented at trial. Sudweeks' expert, John Stahl provided an authoritative, 
logical explanation for the conflicts in property descriptions for the disputed property and 
nearby lots, and offered the only appropriate solution. 
Utah's notice statute for recorded documents (UCA § 57-3-102) negates Gedo's 
claim of ownership. One who deals with real property is charged with notice of what is 
shown or now shown on the county records, and by implication is charged with notice of 
what the county records did not show, i.e., a lack of record title in his grantor. 
Sudweeks had no notice from the public record of any error in the description of 
their property. The mistake in Sudweeks' boundary description was the offspring of a 
description error that occurred in property two parcels away from the Sudweeks, and 
before the Sudweeks' parcels were created by subdivision. Thus, the error was 
perpetuated consistently in the subdivided parcels and would not be distinguishable in the 
Sudweeks chain of title. Indeed, it could not be discovered without a comprehensive 
survey and title search on all neighboring properties, which was performed by John B. 
Stahl, a licensed Utah Surveyor. 
Gedo's deed was recorded almost 30 years after the Sudweeks deed to the same 
property. Hence, under Utah's notice statute, Gedo had notice of flaws in title. Such 
notice imposed the duty to investigate, which would have shown that Gedo had no valid 
claim of ownership because there was no deed in the chain of title that created the parcel 
Gedo claims to own. In essence, Gedo's deed was void for want of a grantor. 
III. GEDO'S CLAIMS OF PROCEDURAL ERRORS ARE WITHOUT 
MERIT. 
Gedo's various allegations of procedural impropriety in the trial court are 
unfounded under the rules of civil procedure. The Gedo brief repeatedly alleges that the 
trial court acted improperly—seemingly in violation of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
In each act or omission alleged, documents on file with the trial court show that 
any dissatisfaction was the result of Gedo's misunderstanding of the appropriate 
procedure or Gedo's own misapplication of the rules. In no case can it be said that the 
court acted inappropriately or that Gedo was prejudiced by a procedural error of the 
court. 
IV. GEDO'S CLAIMS OF CONSPIRACY AND EX PARTE 
COMMUNICATION ARE UNDERMINED BY FACTS IN THE 
RECORD. 
Gedo's accusations of conspiracy, ex parte communication and other illegal or 
improper conduct by the court and counsel, (and the purported deprivation of 
fundamental rights as a result) are wholly unsupported and are undermined by the 
pleadings on file. 
The only evidence of ex parte communication in the entire case is the court's 
rejection of an attempt by Gedo to communicate with Judge Hansen ex parte. Similarly, 
the many references by Gedo to mailing errors by the trial court ignore the central duty of 
litigants to supply the court with a current address. In any event, since Gedo was present 
at every hearing; and was never denied a motion or defaulted for failure to appear or 
respond, if there was any error in mailing, it was harmless. 
V. ATTORNEYS FEES WERE PROPERLY AWARDED AGAINST 
TWO DEFENDANTS IN LIGHT OF THE COURT'S CONTEMPT 
FINDING AGAINST THOSE DEFENDANTS UNDER THE 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER. 
The trial court properly awarded attorney fees and costs as a sanction against 
James and David Gedo for their violation of a Temporary Restraining Order. A 
Temporary Restraining Order was first issued by Judge Hansen upon evidence that those 
two individuals had approached Mr. Sudweeks on his property, holding a breaker bar in 
hand, where they made threats against his health and safety, and that of his wife and 
family. 
At trial, evidence was presented which confirmed that these same two individuals 
subsequently placed threatening phone calls on two different days, to Sudweeks' home, 
again threatening Mr. Sudweeks and his wife and family with physical violence. 
An award of attorney fees is wholly appropriate as a contempt sanction for 
violation of a court order. Unless limited by statute or constitutional provisions, the 
extent of punishment for contempt is discretionary with the court. Thus, the trial court 
has a considerable amount of discretion, and absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial 
court's order should stand. 
ARGUMENT 
L GEDO FAILED TO MARSHAL ANY EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED 
ON APPEAL. 
The Gedo brief makes repeated but oft-times indecipherable allegations regarding 
the trial court's factual findings and even the court itself. In the process of doing so, 
Gedo ignores the essential appellant obligation to first, marshal every scrap of evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings, and secondly, to then show that it is insufficient, 
legally, to support or justify the trial court's ruling. 
A. Even a Pro Se Appellant Cannot Avoid the Marshaling Requirement. 
Even in light of Gedo's pro se appearance, and even acknowledging Supreme 
Court cautions that a layman acting as his own attorney should be indulged, (see Nelson 
v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (UT 1983)) the duty of any appellant to present all 
competent evidence supporting the court's findings cannot be disregarded completely. In 
2002 this very Court stressed the point that, 
. . . in order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which support the very findings 
the appellant resists. 
Neelv v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724, 728 (UT 2002) (emphasis omitted). The Utah Supreme 
Court explained the requirement further, in Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (UT 2004), 
when it declared: 
The challenging party must 'temporarily remove its own prejudices and 
fully embrace the adversary's position'; he or she must play the 'devil's 
advocate.' . . . Furthermore, appellants cannot shift the burden of 
marshaling by falsely claiming that there is no evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings. This would inappropriately force an appellee to 
marshal the evidence in order to refute an appellant's assertion of the 
absence of evidence. 
Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1195 (UT 2004) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Finally, the Supreme Court explains the purpose of the strict marshaling requirement: 
. . . to promote two interrelated court objectives: efficiency and fairness, 
.[a] proper marshaling of the evidence promotes efficiency by avoiding 
'retrying the facts' and by assisting the appellate court in its 'decision-
making and opinion writing.' It promotes fairness by requiring that the 
appellants bear the expense and time of marshaling the evidence rather than 
putting the appellee in the 'precarious position' of performing the 
appellant's work at 'considerable time and expense.'. . . If the marshaling 
requirement is not met, the appellate court has grounds to affirm the court's 
findings on that basis alone. If appellants have failed to properly marshal 
the evidence, we assume that the evidence supports the trial court's 
findings. 
Id. at 1195-1196 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Sudweeks respectfully assert that they have already been required to shoulder an 
unfair burden in this appeal as they have been forced to compensate for the lack of a 
coherent docketing statement or brief, and undertake the research to identify issues and 
then present standards of review. That having been said, they acknowledge the necessity 
of responding to the Gedo brief in order to promote the second purpose stated for the 
marshaling requirement: "assisting the appellate court in its 'decision-making and 
opinion writing." Chen at 1196. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY QUIETED TITLE IN THE 
SUDWEEKS. 
The Trial Court properly quieted title in Sudweeks based upon credible evidence 
presented at trial by Sudweeks' expert, John Stahl, who explained the source of 
conflicting ownership claims. 
A. Sudweeks Presented Credible, Authoritative Evidence at Trial Regarding 
Correct Boundary Lines and Ownership of the Disputed Property. 
Evidence presented at trial by Sudweeks' expert witness, Mr. John Stahl, a 
licensed Utah surveyor, provided an authoritative, logical explanation for the conflicting 
claims of ownership in this case, and suggested the appropriate solution. Relating his 
research and findings, Mr. Stahl offered a comprehensive survey and comparison of 
historic property descriptions for real property parcels surrounding and including those 
claimed by Sudweeks and Gedo. Because a transcript is not available, Mr. Stahl's 
testimony is summarized briefly below. 
Mr. Stahl's research proved that in 1972, a decree of distribution of the estate of 
Ivadell Tomlinson (which estate included the property now owned by Sudweeks) 
contained an erroneous legal description that mistakenly moved the east line of parcel 3 
(Stahl Survey), which adjoined the Tomlinson property, westward 33 feet from its correct 
position. The error also changed the location of the deed "tie" from the North Quarter 
Corner to the Northeast Corner of Section 27 (see Stahl survey/findings, Exhibit "D", 
Addendum.) 
The errant description properly determined the amount of frontage available 
between the two properties located on either side of the Tomlinson property; parcel 2 
(property east of the Tomlinson estate) and parcel 3 (property west of the Tomlinson 
estate). However the description for the Tomlinson property overlapped parcel 3 (west) 
by 33 feet and also resulted in a gap between the Tomlinson property eastern line and the 
west line of parcel 2 (property east of the Tomlinson property, now owned by O'Conner). 
Mr. Stahl's title research, as explained to the trial court, showed that the 
subsequent division of the Tomlinson property into four sub-parcels (parcels 5a, 5b, 5c 
and 5d on Stahl survey, Exhibit "D", Addendum) perpetuated the same description error 
as was contained in the original decree of distribution. 
The error was also propagated into the adjoining descriptions for parcels 3 and 4 
(property west of the Tomlinson property) and parcel 2 (property east of the Tomlinson 
property) as they were modified to agree with the mistaken position of Parcel 5. Indeed, 
Stahl's research showed that with the mistaken shift in boundaries, some interim 
descriptions showed the west line of parcel 4 pushed 33 feet out into the middle of 1500 
East Street. 
East of what was the Tomlinson property, following the inadvertent boundary shift 
to the west, the Utah County Assessor's records began to reflect the existence of a new 
parcel occupying the space between parcel 2b (O'Conner) and 5b (Sudweeks). Mr. Stahl 
showed that by proper description, the boundaries of these parcels are contiguous and no 
property exists in that location. The Utah County Assessor's maps were thus shown to be 
in error as the several maps could not decide where the "ghost" parcel should be placed, 
(See Exhibit "Q", Addendum) and showed the parcels between the O'Conner's property 
and 1500 East Street in the westward-shifted position, based upon the improper location 
of the Tomlinson property (parcel 5 in Stahl survey) in the distribution decree. 
Based upon his findings, and referencing documentation presented as evidence to 
the trial court, (aerial photographic overlay, deeds/chains of title for all lots, survey) Mr. 
Stahl testified that the proper solution to the problem is to record and map corrected 
descriptions for each of the affected parcels (parcels 4, 3, 5c, 5a, 5d and 5b, Stahl 
survey/findings, Exhibit "T>", Addendum) shifting them east 33 feet. 
With regard to the disputed property in which Gedo claims ownership, Mr. Stahl 
further testified that his research turned up no conveyance of record that describes the 
parcel claimed by Gedo (parcel 59, Utah County Plat Map, Exhibit "E", Addendum.) 
That parcel is currently being assessed to Miguel David Gedo and a survey has been 
performed and filed, based upon the gap description. However, he found no conveyance 
document which creates the boundaries of the Gedo claim as it is located by the recorded 
survey and described in the tax notice, with the exception of one portion of the boundary 
created by a 1986 boundary line agreement between other parties. 
Based on records research and on-site inspection, Mr. Stahl testified that the 
adjoining owners of Parcels 5 and 2a (Sudweeks and O'Conners) have clearly occupied 
and paid taxes on their respective sides of the common boundary line. Moreover, Mr. 
Stahl verified that the taxes being currently assessed for the Gedo gap parcel are merely a 
duplicate assessment, since the property is already being assessed to Sudweeks. 
B. Gedo Cannot Claim to Be a Good Faith or Bona Fide Purchaser. 
When Gedo took title to the disputed property, the errors in description (that led to 
the false assumption that the disputed property existed) were a matter of public record. 
Utah Code Annotated, § 57-3-102 (Record Imparts Notice) states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner 
prescribed by this t i t le, . . . shall, from the time of recording with the 
appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that whatever is notice enough to excite attention and 
put a purchaser on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such 
inquiry might have led. See Meagher v. Dean, 91 P.2d 454 (UT, 1939). Based on this 
inquiry responsibility, the Supreme Court has held that where an overlap in descriptions 
of properties created a tract that was sold to both the plaintiff and the defendant under 
separate deeds—leading to a quiet title action, because the plaintiff recorded its notice of 
purchase prior to the recording of the defendant's deed, the defendants took with notice 
of the plaintiffs interest, and title to the tract was properly quieted in the plaintiffs. 
Wilson v. Schneiter's Riverside Golf Course, 523 P.2d 1226 (UT 1974). 
In the present case, inadvertent mistakes in property descriptions resulted in the 
same strip of land being conveyed to Sudweeks and to Gedo. Aside from the fact that 
Gedo's deed was void for want of a grantor, as asserted below, the Sudweeks deed was 
recorded 27 years prior to the Gedo purchase, giving full notice to Gedo of a need for 
inquiry and disqualifying Gedo as a good faith or bona fide purchaser. 
C. Gedo's Deed Was Void for Want of a Grantor. 
A notable difference between this case and the Wilson case previously cited is that 
in this case, what Gedo would have discovered upon reasonable inquiry into the chain of 
title was that the lot being sold to him by Alan Strasburg in 1999 did not actually or 
validly exist. It was the creation of mistaken mapping, not any patent or deed. Gedo had 
a duty to inquire beyond the deeds and maps supplied to him by Mr. Strasburg, the seller. 
See Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644 (UT 1954) (to be bona fide, purchaser's inquiry must 
go beyond persons known to have an interest in concealing the existence of an 
outstanding interest.) An inquiry by Gedo would have shown what Mr. StahPs research 
showed: essentially Gedo's deed was void for want of a valid grantor because Mr. 
Strasburg had no deed or patent granting him the property. (See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-4 
(attempt to convey more than grantor owns)) All Mr. Strasburg had to support a claim 
was a tax assessment created when the Utah County Assessor noticed a gap lot (created 
by the mistaken description) and assigned it to Strasburg. Meanwhile, the Sudweeks 
were also being assessed for the same property. 
III. GEDO'S CLAIMS OF PROCEDURAL ERRORS ARE WITHOUT 
MERIT. 
Gedo's various allegations of procedural impropriety in the trial court lack any 
real basis under the rules of civil procedure. The Gedo brief repeatedly alleges that the 
trial court acted improperly. This particular class of allegations concern actions governed 
by rules of civil procedure. The claims include: (1) exclusion of evidence, (2) denial of 
motions and defenses, (3) improper exercise of jurisdiction, (4) improper changes of 
assigned judges, (5) improper service, (6) denial of jury request, and (7) improper 
permission to amend complaint. The oft-repeated allegation of a conspiracy between the 
court, the U.S. Postal service and Sudweeks counsel to deprive Gedo of notice of court 
proceedings is addressed separately. 
Because Gedo failed to marshal the evidence to show that the trial court acted 
without justification, Sudweeks respectfully lists the allegations by category and refers 
the court to authorities and information from the trial court files that contradicts the Gedo 
claims. 
(1) exclusion of evidence: 
Rule 1005 of the Rules of Evidence requires, in pertinent part, that: 
The contents of an official record, or of a document authorized to be 
recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed, including data compilations 
in any form, if otherwise admissible, may be proved by copy, certified as 
correct in accordance with Rule 902 or testified to be correct by a witness 
who has compared it with the original.. . 
By Gedo's own admission, the trial court refused to accept "muniments of title" 
that Gedo attempted to introduce as evidence because there was no one from the county 
recorder's office to authenticate the offerings. Nothing in Gedo's brief points to 
improper rejection of evidence under the applicable rules. 
"Trial court judges are, necessarily, afforded considerable discretion in 
determining the conduct of a trial, including the orderly presentation of evidence." 
Gilbert v. Cosco, Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 403 (10th Cir. 1993). In facilitating the presentation 
of evidence, the trial judge "is allowed to participate in a trial and ask questions of 
witnesses in order to ascertain the facts," United States v. Wheeler, 444 F.2d 385, 390 
(10 Cir. 1971), and to "clarify the issues [and] assist the jury in eliminating immaterial 
matters." Smith v.Welch, 189 F.2d 832, 835 (10th Cir. 1951). 
Because a trial judge is given considerable discretion in determining the conduct 
of a trial, "[t]he standard for reversal on the basis of judicial misconduct in a civil trial is 
quite high." Pau v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1991). 
Reversal is not required where the judge emphasizes evidence or expresses skepticism at 
a witness' answer, provided the witness has an opportunity to respond. Id. Additionally, 
"[cjutting comments to counsel, particularly those relating to skill rather than good faith 
or integrity, will not generally mandate reversal." Id. 
(2) denial of motions and defenses: 
It is noted that Gedo did not plead laches as an affirmative defense in the trial 
court, nor was that claim made in any motion, styled as such. Moreover, Gedo did not 
ever file a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion. The documents filed by 
Gedo with the trial court are included in the Gedo brief as Addendum #5 and include: 
"Request for Change of Judge", "Demand to Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction, 
and Litigation Fees" "Request for Dismissal Quiet Title and Request for Defense Fees 
$10,000.00, Request to Quash Complaint Orders," "Affidavit and Request for 
Disqualification of Judge Nunc Pro Tunc and Certificate of Counsel," and "Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order" 
Judge Hansen of the Fourth District Court entered a memorandum decision 
striking Gedo's "Demand to Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction, Litigation Fees" 
and Defendants' "Request for Dismissal Quiet Title and Request for Defense Fees" 
(Gedo Brief, Addendum #5) (Judge Hansen's Memorandum Decision is Exhibit "K", 
Addendum.) The ruling was based on the fact that Rule 10(f), Utah R. Civ. P. provides 
that parties may be required to substitute properly prepared pleadings for nonconforming 
pleadings. Additionally, Rule 5(d) provides that papers filed with the court "shall be 
accompanied by a certificate of service showing the date and manner of service 
completed by the person effecting service." Finding the documents illegible and 
improper, Judge Hansen struck the pleadings and invited Gedo to submit properly 
prepared pleadings. Gedo did not do so. 
Gedo's "Request for Change of Judge" was ruled on by Judge Taylor (Gedo Brief 
Addendum #5.) Therein he noted Gedo's request required referral to the reviewing judge 
under Rule 63(b)(C)(2). He therefore denied Sudweeks' motion to strike, and referred 
Gedo's request to Judge Stott for review. 
On review, Judge Stott found that the request did not comply with requirements of 
applicable rules; the court was unable to understand either the allegations or the basis for 
the request, and not being able to identify any impropriety occurred by Judge Taylor or 
anyone else, Judge Stott denied the request and referred the case back to Judge Taylor. 
(Exhibit "L", Addendum.) The Gedo motion for restraining order was a cross-motion to 
Sudweeks' prior motion. Gedo's motion was negated when the Sudweeks opposing 
motion was granted after hearing before Judge Hansen. (Exhibit "I", Addendum.) The 
denial of injunctive relief is reviewed by an abuse of discretion, which occurs only when 
the trial court bases its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no 
rational basis in the evidence for the ruling. See Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish 
Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 881 (Utah 1996). Comparison of the information filed with the 
court regarding the cross motions for temporary restraining order, it is clear that the trial 
court had a rational basis for granting injunctive relief to Sudweeks and not to Gedo. 
(3) improper exercise of jurisdiction: 
Gedo argues at pages 17 and 19 of the brief that Gedo attempted a special or 
limited appearance only to submit "muniments of ownership." However, the court record 
shows that Gedo filed an answer to the Sudweeks complaint on May 26, 2001 (Gedo 
Brief, Addendum #5) wherein Gedo did not enter any defenses specifically, did not claim 
or call for a special appearance, did not allege lack of jurisdiction, but did assert 
counterclaims against Sudweeks. Even disregarding the fact that Gedo resides in Utah 
County, the subject property is in Utah County and all parties are in Utah County and 
therefore, jurisdiction is proper in the Fourth District Court pursuant to UCA §78-3-4(1), 
Gedo's filing of an answer and counterclaims without any mention of a limited 
appearance acted as a general appearance and submission to the trial court's jurisdiction. 
Barber v.Calder, 522 .2d 700 (UT 1974). 
(4) improper changes of assigned judges: 
Inasmuch as this case was initiated by complaint in April of 2001 and did not go to 
trial until December of 2003, it is not surprising that under the standard rotation schedule 
in the Fourth District Court, at least one change of judges would occur, as it did. Not 
understanding the local court management, Gedo has improperly assumed something 
sinister in the rotation. 
(5) improper service: 
Proof of proper service upon Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Sanchez 
is included as Exhibit "M", Addendum. 
(6) denial of jury request: 
Rule 38, Utah R. Civ. P. provides in sub-section (d) (Waiver) the failure of a party 
to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand as required by this rule (not later than 10 days 
after service of the last pleading directed to the issue to be tried) and to file it as required 
by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury. Granting or denying a belated 
demand for jury trial is within the discretion of the trial court. Webb v. Webb, 209 P.2d 
201 (UT 1949). 
From the court record, after almost 3 years of litigation, at the pre-trial conference, 
when all motions and pleadings had long since been filed and the trial was scheduled in 
less than 30 days, Gedo claimed a right to a jury trial. Gedo never made the proper 
demand as required under the rules, nor did Gedo proffer the necessary fee. The trial 
court was well within its discretion in denying the demand. 
(7) improper permission to amend complaint: 
Motions to amend the complaint are left to the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Norman v. Arnold, 57 P.3d 997 (UT 2002). Furthermore, liberality should be shown in 
allowance of amendments to pleadings for purpose of permitting complete adjudication 
of matters in controversy and in furtherance of justice. Johnson v. Peck, 63 P.2d 251 (UT 
1936). 
After protracted discovery was completed, Sudweeks felt that the introduction of 
additional facts warranted the addition of two new theories of ownership and petitioned 
the court for leave to amend. Court documentation shows that no ex parte hearing took 
place. A copy of the motion was mailed to the addresses on file for Gedo. No opposition 
was submitted and the motion was eventually granted. Gedo cannot claim prejudice 
because the amendment came almost a year before the trial was set. 
For each allegation of wrong-doing, documents from the court or from Gedo, 
show that any dissatisfaction was the result of Gedo's misunderstanding of the 
appropriate procedural requirements or Gedo's own misapplication of the rules. In no 
case can it be said that the court acted inappropriately or that Gedo was prejudiced by a 
procedural error of the court. 
IV. GEDO'S CLAIMS OF CONSPIRACY AND EX PARTE 
COMMUNICATION ARE UNDERMINED BY FACTS IN THE 
RECORD. 
Gedo's accusations of conspiracy, ex parte communication and other illegal or 
improper conduct by the court and counsel, (and the purported deprivation of 
fundamental rights as a result) are wholly unsupported and are undermined by the 
pleadings on file. 
The only evidence of ex parte communication in the entire case is the court's 
rejection of an attempt by Gedo to communicate with Judge Hansen ex parte. (Exhibit 
"N", Addendum.) Similarly, the many references by Gedo to mailing errors are purely 
distractive to the central duty of litigants to supply the court with their proper address. 
Gedo's claim of a conspiracy is made moot by the fact that Gedo appeared at every 
hearing and conference that was held in this matter. Since Gedo was in attendance at 
every hearing and conference; since Gedo received notice of every decision in time to 
respond; and since no motion was granted for lack of a response from Gedo, if there was 
any error, it was harmless. 
V. ATTORNEYS FEES WERE PROPERLY AWARDED AGAINST 
TWO DEFENDANTS FOR CONTEMPT UNDER THE 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER. 
The trial court properly awarded attorney fees and costs as a sanction against 
James and David Gedo for their violation of a Temporary Restraining Order. A 
Temporary Restraining Order was first issued by Judge Hansen upon evidence that those 
two individuals had approached Mr. Sudweeks on his property, holding a breaker bar in 
hand, where they made threats against his health and safety, and that of his wife and 
family. (Exhibit "I", Addendum.) These same two individuals were present in the court 
hearing when the Temporary Restraining Order was converted to a Preliminary 
Injunction against them—prohibiting any communication or contact with the Sudweeks. 
(Exhibit "J", Addendum.) 
At trial, evidence was presented which confirmed that these same two individuals 
subsequently placed threatening phone calls on two different days to Sudweeks' home, 
again threatening Mr. Sudweeks and his wife and family with physical violence. 
"Unless limited by statute or constitutional provisions, the extent of punishment 
for contempt is discretionary with the court . . ." 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 117 (1999). Under 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-32-11 (1992) (as amended) attorney fees may be awarded in a 
contempt proceeding brought for a party's failure to comply with an order. See, 
Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 533 (Utah 1981). An award of attorney fees is 
wholly appropriate as a contempt sanction for violation of a court order, particularly 
where violent threats are involved. Thus, the trial court had a considerable amount of 
discretion in sanctioning Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo, and absent an abuse of 
that discretion, the trial court's order should stand. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment quieting title in the Sudweeks is supported by credible 
evidence as well as appropriate statutory guidelines related to public records of title. At 
trial, the Sudweeks demonstrated the nature and cause of the boundary description error 
leading to conflicting ownership claims. The evidence showed that two different deeds 
(the first to Sudweeks in 1972, the second to Gedo in 1999) purported to convey the same 
33' wide strip of property. Chain of title research demonstrated that at the time the 
property was conveyed to Sudweeks, the grantors were vested with title to the land, but 
the property description was mistakenly offset by 33 feet to the west. In direct contrast, 
never at any time was title properly vested in Gedo's grantor; there being no deed or 
patent that granted the disputed parcel to Mr. Strasburg, Gedo's predecessor. Therefore, 
the trial court's ruling is proper and should be upheld. 
Gedo's claims of impropriety are groundless, and arise from a misunderstanding 
of procedural requirements. They create no basis for relief from the Court. This is 
particularly true in light of Gedo's failure to marshal evidence as required for all appeals. 
Sudweeks respectfully ask that the appeal be denied on all points and that the trial court 
ruling stand. 
Dated this f day of February, 2006. 
BRETT C. ANDERSO 
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Exhibit "A" 
Provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations 
United States Constitution: Amendment I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
United States Constitution: Amendment XIV 
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
57-1-4. Attempted conveyance of more than grantor owns — Effect. 
A conveyance made by an owner of an estate for life or years, purporting to convey a 
greater estate than he could lawfully transfer, does not work a forfeiture of his estate, but 
passes to the grantee all the estate which the grantor could lawfully transfer. 
57-3-102. Record imparts notice - Change in interest rate -- Validity of document -
- Notice of unnamed interests -- Conveyance by grantee. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed 
by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document complying with 
Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of location 
complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement complying with Section 
70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged shall, from the time of recording with the 
appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest rate in 
accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured 
obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document provided under 
Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to the parties to 
the document and all other persons who have notice of the document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, names the 
grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without naming beneficiaries or 
stating the terms of the trust does not charge any third person with notice of any interest 
of the grantor or of the interest of any other person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to him free 
and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he appears as grantee or in 
any other document recorded in accordance with this title that sets forth the names of the 
beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and describes the real property subject to the 
interest. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law 
certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, 
and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final 
judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions 
of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United 
States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States 
or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree 
felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative 
subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over 
which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of 
record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of 
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
review 
those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue 
all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other 
local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a 
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not 
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, 
visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of 
the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and 
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
78-32-11. Damages to party aggrieved. 
If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or special proceeding, prejudicial to 
his rights therein, is caused by the contempt, the court, in addition to the fine or 
imprisonment imposed for the contempt or in place thereof, may order the person 
proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to indemnify him 
and to satisfy his costs and expenses; which order and the acceptance of money under it is 
a bar to an action by the aggrieved party for such loss and injury. 
UT. R. Civ. P., Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service: When required. 
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the 
court, every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every 
pleading subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, 
every written motion other than one heard ex parte, and every written notice, 
appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon 
each of the parties. 
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that: 
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court; 
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be 
served with all pleadings and papers; 
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any 
hearing necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the 
defaulting party; 
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of 
judgment under Rule 58A(d); and 
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in 
default for any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of 
summons in Rule 4. 
(a)(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, 
attachment, garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is 
named as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an 
answer, claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or 
possession of the property at the time of its seizure. 
(b) Service: How made and by whom. 
(b)(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon 
a party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney 
unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or 
upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last 
known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. 
(b)(1)(A) Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to 
the party; or leaving it at the person's office with a clerk or person in charge 
thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; 
or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the 
person's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion then residing therein; or, if consented to in writing by the person to 
be served, delivering a copy by electronic or other means. 
(b)(1)(B) Service by mail is complete upon mailing. If the paper served is notice of 
a hearing and if the hearing is scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service, 
service shall be by delivery or other method of actual notice. Service by electronic 
means is complete on transmission if transmission is completed during normal 
business hours at the place receiving the service; otherwise, service is complete on 
the next business day. 
(b)(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court: 
(b)(2)(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a 
judgment signed by the court shall be served by the party preparing it; 
(b)(2)(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be 
served by the party preparing it; and 
(b)(2)(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court. 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there is an unusually 
large number of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own initiative, may 
order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be 
made as between the defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed 
to be denied or avoided by all other parties and that the filing of any such pleading 
and service thereof upon the plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties. A 
copy of every such order shall be served upon the parties in such manner and form 
as the court directs. 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be 
filed with the court either before or within a reasonable time after service. The 
papers shall be accompanied by a certificate of service showing the date and 
manner of service completed by the person effecting service. Rule 26(i) governs 
the filing of papers related to discovery. 
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers with the 
court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the 
court, except that the judge may accept the papers, note thereon the filing date and 
forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk. 
UT. R. Civ. P., Rule 10. Form of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All pleadings and other 
papers filed with the court shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the 
court, the title of the action, the file number, the name of the pleading or other 
paper, and the name, if known, of the judge (and commissioner if applicable) to 
whom the case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the action shall include the 
names of all the parties, but other pleadings and papers need only state the name of 
the first party on each side with an indication that there are other parties. A party 
whose name is not known shall be designated by any name and the words "whose 
true name is unknown." In an action in rem, unknown parties shall be designated as 
"all unknown persons who claim any interest in the subject matter of the action." 
Every pleading and other paper filed with the court shall also state the name, 
address, telephone number and bar number of any attorney representing the party 
filing the paper, which information shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the 
first page. Every pleading shall state the name and address of the party for whom it 
is filed; this information shall appear in the lower left-hand corner of the last page 
of the pleading. The plaintiff shall file together with the complaint a completed 
cover sheet substantially similar in form and content to the cover sheet approved by 
the Judicial Council. 
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense shall be 
made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far 
as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph may 
be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. Each claim founded upon a 
separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be 
stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear 
presentation of the matters set forth. 
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a pleading may be adopted by 
reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading, or in any 
motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes. 
(d) Paper quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings and other papers filed with 
the court, except printed documents or other exhibits, shall be typewritten, printed 
or photocopied in black type on good, white, unglazed paper of letter size (8 V2" x 
11"), with a top margin of not less than 2 inches above any typed material, a left-
hand margin of not less than 1 inch, a right-hand margin of not less than one-half 
inch, and a bottom margin of not less than one-half inch. All typing or printing 
shall be clearly legible, shall be double-spaced, except for matters customarily 
single-spaced or indented, and shall not be smaller than 12-point size. Typing or 
printing shall appear on one side of the page only. 
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed under all signature lines, and all 
signatures shall be made in permanent black or blue ink. 
(f) Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. The clerk of the court shall 
examine all pleadings and other papers filed with the court. If they are not prepared 
in conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept the filing but may require 
counsel to substitute properly prepared papers for nonconforming papers. The clerk 
or the court may waive the requirements of this rule for parties appearing pro se. 
For good cause shown, the court may relieve any party of any requirement of this 
rule. 
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper filed in any 
action or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or without notice, 
authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the original. 
UT. R. Civ. P., Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a 
defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the 
summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after 
service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served 
with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty 
days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the 
answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by 
the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise 
directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as 
follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion directed 
to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding 
to the remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the 
merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the 
court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite 
statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be 
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) 
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to 
join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made 
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is 
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a 
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such 
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse 
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at 
the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting 
the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and 
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment 
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within 
such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the 
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and 
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the 
hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be 
required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite 
statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the 
defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order 
of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or within such 
other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the 
motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading 
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a 
party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order 
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may 
join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party 
makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and 
objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party 
shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so 
omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented 
either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an 
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim 
may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for 
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection 
or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the 
light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the 
denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of 
such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action 
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion 
to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be 
awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the 
reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 
undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs and 
charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of 
any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking 
as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion 
of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
UT. R. Civ. P., Rule 38. Jury trial of right. 
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution or as 
given by statute shall be preserved to the parties. 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a 
jury by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other parties a demand 
therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later 
than 10 days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue. Such 
demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of the party. 
(c) Same: specification of issues. In his demand a party may specify the issues 
which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial by 
jury for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for only some of 
the issues, any other party, within 10 days after service of the demand or such 
lesser time as the court may order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any 
other or all of the issues of fact in the action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand as 
required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by 
him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be 
withdrawn without the consent of the parties. 
UT. R. Civ. P., Rule 63. Disability or disqualification of a judge. 
(a) Substitute judge; Prior testimony. If the judge to whom an action has been 
assigned is unable to perform the duties required of the court under these rules, 
then any other judge of that district or any judge assigned pursuant to Judicial 
Council rule is authorized to perform those duties. The judge to whom the case is 
assigned may in the exercise of discretion rehear the evidence or some part of it. 
(b) Disqualification. 
(1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to disqualify 
a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that the motion is filed in 
good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating facts sufficient to show 
bias, prejudice or conflict of interest. 
(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not later than 
20 days after the last of the following: 
(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge; 
(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or 
(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is based. 
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the motion shall be 
filed as soon as practicable. 
(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate under Rule 11 and 
subjects the party or attorney to the procedures and sanctions of Rule 11. No party 
may file more than one motion to disqualify in an action. 
(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without 
further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the motion and 
affidavit to a reviewing judge. If the judge grants the motion, the order shall direct 
the presiding judge of the court or, if the court has no presiding judge, the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council to assign another judge to the action or hearing. The 
presiding judge of the court, any judge of the district, any judge of a court of like 
jurisdiction, or the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may serve as the 
reviewing judge. 
(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely filed, 
filed in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge shall assign another 
judge to the action or hearing or request the presiding judge or the presiding officer 
of the Judicial Council to do so. 
(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge may consider any 
part of the record of the action and may request of the judge who is the subject of 
the motion and affidavit an affidavit responsive to questions posed by the 
reviewing judge. 
(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a timely manner. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah Stool 
JOHN R. SUDWEEKS, and 
DEANNA SUDWEEKS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ 
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES Cil'\Ui, 
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and 
MARTHA O'CONNOR. 
Defendants. 
J>C 
Judge James R. Taylor 
< •'' • »r<-_ !..-,, i: ., i.v,.,.),,; a!K] j )liit;i;;., '-•(!<... ', v, ;->. .i-.! through counsel, 
Brett C Anderson, i-: the lav. firm Hansen Witt Morley & Anderson, I' <' and Complain against the 
Defendants above named, a u! ilie-v* a<= lollows: 
1. Pl .uii t iM's • • s i d i n g in U t a h I oi . ; :-.:.•.:^ v.., , u ih . 
2. Defendants Maria Angelica Sanchez, Miguel Dav.dv.iOv!';. lames Gedo, Johnny Ray 
O'Conner and Ma'-t!;;1,'»'''Ptincr, aiL i--!:v;d!;nls residing :., = * - ' •• 
3. I rwnparcv.
 ;...;i real property in Pleasant v. novo City, Utah County, State 
of Utah (the "Sudvveeks Properu" • < no parcel which is described in the Warrant) Deed from Joseph 
Best.::' * !'! i .i. itol lunr ' I |'» n .inriii i unloil limo .'. , l ' ) 7 j : i , 1 nlr\ No. 
91 and Page 224 of the Records of the Utah County Recorder's Office, and the second 
. .lii.gs due -ociaidiiiv- > . s idings 
to Plaintiffs, dated Auguv 2': K* 1 as Entry No, 13361, Book 1290 and Page 108 of the Records 
ofthe I [ta1'fVim'* ^<v *- ;!?»•'- f *' \ • \ <•:*' <*' .K ' '* " r nlliu hnl lieirti asKIn!.it 
'V . jmplamt. 
Sudwceks have beui !iu M ' \ and e x c l u d e owners of the above described 
parcels smee l . ' •" i : ' ~1. 
^ \ ;,iuui.,i.} Juiii. * i^u */ * wnner and Martha O'Conner are the owner - f a ; -
of real properK in I" oas.iii! (iroxe Titv. (Ymniv i»f Utah, State of Utah '•h^ "<N'Oonner nropc"* ,s 
/ aMuuty Deed from Mi.san ^ Haidinger to Defendants i JVonner dated August in. 19".. a*-
\ u . 64616, Book :W)7 and Pages 855 and 856 ofthe Records of the - '* " • 
6. Defendant Maria Angelica Sanchez and Defendant Miguel David Gedo claini an 
ownership intere^' '" rt*r nr*^- '- *• n!rasar- ' ^ \ 
"!aih|at Propel ... ^ . . D . J .ii i.ic ^ ...; * ^n iJec-d trom Miguel l »avid Gedo to Maria 
Angelica Sanchez dated October 8,2000 and recorded October ! *.». i 909 as Entr\ W 1 i ? '33, Pook 
5248 and Pa<zes65-1 6^6 ofthe Re, vi > • '*:' • i M > 11 I I t 
7. Tlu ^Mi»jL-cl ic il piupcrty paael is approximately 33 feet \>"!e and K* =Kt ' 
between the SudwcV. «. 
subject ; ;.;. . u ^ i. 
8. TheMihiect real property parcel r1-1 the O'Conner Property were pan: tofa larger tract 
ni l iinl ' Inn Ii \\ is I . / . ecessors in interest. 
2 
9. The boundary between the O'Conner Property on the west and the subject real 
Pr0pC rh parrel on the east is marked : --^ * -nd drr eix'::* s *-. ,l\ have both been in existence 
e, ai id the fei ice was . . J " : . • : : : • ... the pin cl lase of their pai eels 
in 1972. 
; j . , 
been recognized ana Ucaied b) the pen .JO> UJ:W ^  en predecessor m miuei^wib inebuiinuai\ hciv. ;vi, 
the subject real property ptn -. . * < -lane :i L Plaintiffs mopertv on the east since 1972 when 
he Plaintiffs ha^  L leasonabiy believed thai their property line extended up U } -. 
fence :md envewav line srr.ee thL-v purchased their parcels in 1(>72, and thev 1IMV--* *; mtinued to use 
! Lb, L \ : . . . ,- . ..: n 
aspha ' pad on the same. 
•d •• :"!M- V!-'Lici Davu1 ' -v • lames Ge.1 >*V Va-i.i / • -<Ju i Sanche. 
•*
 t r .-m; mtentiona. .. ve a wreckme :iu^k upon an.. „ * me sa;m e«. me -laini.;: *-
property directly in front of the Plaintiffs motor home. 
diking nflhe w terknii' lurk 'i ics piolvihl Ihe Plaintiffs fiem II\IIU« their in I i 
l^me^MU .I.L> j^wi^ -t lunwve ,
 ;l*. n ..icir property. 
.*v< ithstanding the demands from Plaintiffs to Defendants Miguel David Gedo, 
iS
 •* * '*- • •
 x
 ia A ngelica Sai ichez , i eqi lesting the /!: the 1 « > i Peking ti i lck be reiiio'''\ 'ed fi: or i ii I 
i I I'ian'ttil'is' motor home, said Defendants have refiised to remove the wrecking truck fi oi n 
jii iron! of Plaintiffs' motor home, claiming said Defendants have title to the subject property as 
3 
i IKS I ! \ U M , O l ACTION 
(Quiet Iiiicl 
15. Plaintiffs re-aliein and IIK oipnuln .tl1 n' flu foregoing paragraphs herein by this 
re fen in t 
Id Plaintiffs are the record owners of the two parcels ul i< alpiopntv as d uii' 
paragraph 3 hen in 
I > Plaintiffs have been the sole and exclusive fee simple owners of said two parcels 
of real property since the> acquired the r<\\ 'r ,~". 
I- Pl.nnlifli 11*1 vt soli l> an:. .^iu;>«.u) used and occupied the said two parcels of 
real property since they acquired the sanv :•; "*'".'.: to the exclusion of all others. 
i l> Plaintiffs have been the ^.l. • "'TW tec -OMC owners of the subject 31 
ile ('iiu el ik »i i ibed in paragraph 6 herein to the exclusion of all others since Plaintiffs 
acquired the same in 1972. 
2(1 Plaintiffs h.ivr snh Is .nid > ' " IL.CCI and occupied the said subject 33 foot 
w nil' |uuel ol ical pioputy desciibed in paragraph 6 herein, to the exclusion of all others 
Jl Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree and oulei qim lmt> lull in I'l.iintills, and against 
Defendants herein n inn d in III* paurls ol leal pioperly described in Paragraphs 3 and (> herein 
M TON!) CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Boundaij It) Au|iiirsi i m <i 
22. Plaiulill i. it1 alkj;i and uuoipoiatc all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this 
reference. 
23. Plaintiffs have occupied th< n r<'>ptrti\< pmpulj rind lieakd it as thtir own up to 
tin1 Inn • ": " is iiiciit i tl b) a lence and duveway on the east side of the subject 33 foot wide 
parcel winch is claimed to be owned by Defendant Sanchez and Detoinlrinl Mo«ui I 1 )A\ id * n do 
4 
? 
s! <-i [hsu predecessors in interest have occupied their respective 
property only P : •* uii the eac< side 
fence, :. ~>wv „..»: ^rrespond, .; ...n..u. - • „ w. ,• i the cast side of wn subject ^> l.v; ui.u 
parcel claimed to be owned hy Defendant Sanchez and Defendant Daivd Miguel *">d<-
line, M iiiu- K> ihaiK-.*' ;>y the fence and driveway, and corresponding line, as the boundary 
between the OVOUIH'T property and »\ ^'udweeks property. 
..r »< >'< \ Miner are adjoining landowners,, as were 
Plaintins and Defendant O'Connor's predecessors in interest. 
27 1 Maintiffs are entitled " ; decrc • -' 'h ' r t r '• : 
east bi^c oi the odbject parcel, JI-IM- de^eti'Dea.. is the 
ii
 a!ii:ary between the O'Conner ProperU and die Stuhveeks Property. 
.
v
 e 
M: actermining tluu i iuuitilb IIUVL acquneu M»IC and exuuuve ::,e u me above described 33 
foot wide subject parcel via the doctrine of boundary hv vvn'-i'scence. 
T H I R P 
(Prescriptive Easement) 
29 Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all of the foie^owv.' naraeraohs herein tr 
30. Plaintiffs have openly used and < ^ , upkd he subject parcel u Such H described m 
paragraph 6 above :\"<\ h:n*c treated it as tbe-~ • , ; . . , - ; • . • l 
ihe parcel which is claimed n; ot L-WIICU by Defendant Sanchez ai.-i 
Defendant Miguel David Gedo, and Plaintiffs have so occupied the same continuously since 
5 
1972. - ' • 
31 During Plaintiffs' i ise and occupation of the subject parcel, Plaintiffs have erected 
a fence, planted trees, grass and plants, and have constructed an asphalt pad on the subject 
propei ty and used the same to park their motor home. 
;
 IMamuff>' use o:* i\\c 'ubject parcel has at all times been adverse to the Defendaiits 
'laiiiiifi^* use o; im ^uijcci paiVv I ikj.> a: all times been notorious. 
\l\c alternative \* I'K Ouiet 'I ;ta- and [boundary by Acquiescence claims, 
I ' L i h l ' r l '* :• 
easement in the subject parcel whicl. runs u it; Me <ame, and mat said prescriptive easement 
• iil vv.dude al! o r!be ^;iu;e;-f " •* •*< -^ v- the r,,!iee and d»-!\:-". v ^''c* ,M' fb 0:1^ 1 cu je Mfthe 
same, ; ;. «: .:i . . \ ^ . ^ ,-_.. growing ai id maintaining plants, trees, . 
and grass, and other typical and general uses. 
FOI IRTHC M ISE OF "I C I IOT I" 
(Trespa.* • ,
 :. \liguel Da\ id Gedo, James Gedo and Mai la Angelica Sanchez) 
iaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this 
referei ice. 
! >eK iidaiits ^Miguel David Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez have acted in such a 
manner as to damaue the Plaintiili' property, and have prohibited them from the quiet use and 
1 
tamiii'ls are entitled to judgment against Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James 
Credo '"-d Maria Angelica Sanchez for damages and for injury to Plaintiffs' property in an 
ai 1 10111 it to be si io\ \ 1 1 at ti ial. 
38 Plaintiffs are also entitled to punitive damages as a result of Defendant Miguel 
6 
trespass on Plaintiffs* propeily with knowing and intentional disregard for Plaintiffs' rights 
therein, in an amount to be determined at ti lal. 
HI'Ml i U ISM HI ACTION 
(Forcible Detainer by Miguel Dnivri Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica 
S i in I In ' ) 
39 Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this 
reference. 
40, i !'.. • ..... . . . \ . J : . » . \ ; iy jwt*i i a n j ; . - . 
iinlawfully enter a portion of Plaintiffs' prope?t\ m Plaintiffs" absence and have exch , 
Plaintiffs from use-w:.'r-r^-e^Gi'*:-of Plaintiff" rrop-T!\ v r ;.:r \ * i:^"*? 
the same to be paiK..^ „it i'ijim.;]. ' property between Plaintiffs niiiu-i n^ne and the \UA,U\. 
street. 
41. n • I 
S.iiicliL/. have damaged the i'i untiitb and ILAL prohibited them horn the quiet use dial ui|u>u •- * 
ol their property. 
i lei Da ' - id Gedo lames Gedo ai l i I\ lai ia A ngelica Sanchez 1 la e 
refuse* in M n i ei ider Plaint I f fs' property being unlawfully occupied by said Defendants after 
denial* w-i*= made on <;\U\ Defendants for the surrender uf the *^VP\I^^ unlawfully em---^ 
l . . L S 
Gedo and \\ana Angelica Sanchez loi damages anting trom said 1 >etendants> forcible detain, -
in an amount to be i>in ^ •* -< *M- • 
44 Purina ^
 v wv;w Aim. $, •• ;. , • , , .Jfs are entitled to have their 
damages against Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez for 
7 
jj'Mwui to i taii k *'th* Aim s> /*>- >b-10.5. Plaintiffs are entitled lr 
r . ^ t i t ^ i . ^ directing Defendar^ Miguel David Gedo, James !~ do -. \ - •-• . 
i'^.perty being unlawfully - . eupied b\ said Defendants an 
n> renove all property of said Defendants and to restore said premises to Plaintiffs or be forcibly 
removed by a sheriff 11 f ' ' 
SIXTH CAUSE O F ACTION 
(111 junction) 
• • I liiinlifTs rr-alleL't" ;ind inn>ipoiaU' all of, (In- loiegomg paiagiap.ib nerein by this 
reference. 
47. "iaintiffs are entitled h • I-M-MM^ ?> relief permanently ei yoinii lg the [Vfaidunt11 
fii; • : i t 1 c :ciip> ii lg 01 ti espassing
 I 
48. I laintiffs are entitled to muiL-. . •. c relief directing Defendants Miguel David 
Gedo, James Gedo a"d Marin Vvv J-Vp S:uv-i- •-.*•* ' * 
\\ recking ti i lck ai id -AWJI [;i^t^:,j p. t«^u -n h a m u l i . piup^rU in oi under the direction of 
said Defendants, 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs J : 1 n I R Si ldv = eks and Deani la Si iii/vv eeks pi a> for ji idgi i lei it 
ayainsl llit: Deteiidarits as follows: 
1. On the First Cause or' Action for n< order quieting title in Plaintiffs to the parcels 
of real j. * rr -*• Jc 5 r- • > 
2. e n .... fecund Cause oi v n« i ; ne alternative, awarding to Plaintiffs, the 
parcel of real property described in paragraph 6 above, under the doctrine of Boundary I y 
A • :quiescence. 
3. On the Third Cause of Action in the alternative, declaring a prescriptive easement 
p 
growing and maintaining trees, plants and grass, and other typical and general uses. 
4. On the Fourth C^n^c of Acti-"1 '^r1^!' r,vr - c r ' -"•' " i ,s!T ,%1 damauec a°-Mnst 
Defendants Miguel Da i id G. -.• . s i ;-:ul „...i .\,«.... ^ v . . u aancnez L a;, umo,.. >e 
shown at trial. 
Miguel Dai\ id Ucuu, jaines Gedo and Maria Angelica Sam SK,/ in an amount to be determined at 
f MI. a::»: an order ot'restitu:j«i «int-ctiniz Defendants Miguel 1 )avw' ( u\\n kunes Gedn <ud 
. , , - . . i ; • , • * > . • , . ; 
Ny said Defendants and to restore said premises u PlamUi. 
6. n n J • ^^i*- Cain* ^f Action rwv^f an i""a:\ ' •• r Tmanentlv ""•' — n<: 
. • i v . . ^ f . I .. . .:..,. . . ^ancnez ;:.;.;; uhiiiL, 
occupying or trespassing on the subject parcel H real proneiK and directing said Defendants : 
remove said nropcr" *Kc ^  -rrVi^i- trurk -r - \ , n* t v " --V « : jl ./- ," 
real proper; . v ^ .. ,,.. vi.;^,..,*. u* ou.vi ; ^iendaiiij. 
7. For an order that Defendants Miguel Daivd Gedo, James Gedo and Maria 
\ il.W s -'1 Ml tV | 
8. for Ddtii oilier aiKi ;»Hihu iuiu as the i u.ai niav deem appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
I) = \ 1 ED tl lis £L_i_,di i.) i f • J l ' (' ,2003. 
HANSEN WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C. 
BRETT C. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
1 hereby cerUv th:it •' n< i..-.; •< :>ue ant! mrrect coin ,•• (lie foregoing, AIMKMM1',I) 
( OIMTI AlNI,p p. .-j •  ,\ . 1, on 'NO',, In !ln-
following: 
Maria Angelica Sanchez 
West 800 NV-
• TTtah84P. 
.i.L'iiel David Gedo 
- '"Box 970002 
Orem, Utah 84097 
Miguel David Gedo 
361 West 800 North 
Provo, Utah 84061 
James Gedo 
361 West 800 North 
Provo, Utah 84061 
Johnny Ray O'Connor 
1640 East Battlecreek Dr. 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Martha O'Connor 
1640 East Battlecreek Dr. 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
John and Deanna Sudv* . '•• 
1610 East 200 South 
Pleasant Grove, I 'tali .S4oo_ 
2 1 
Exhibit "C" 
Complaint 
COPY 
C 
Brett C. Anderson, Bar No. 8134 
Gordon W. Duval, Bar No. 6532 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Telephone (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile (801) 785-0853 
:i ! \ A :\ l n J L i 'R I A L U O i M l i C •' • 
\H COUNTN , STATi'()!• U IAH 
, /5 North HH) West, Prow,. \ \ M601 
JOHN R. SUDWEEKS, and 
DEANNA SUDWEEKS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCUu/., MKIUI ; 
DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO. JOHNNY 
RAY O'CONNOR, and MARTHA 
O'CONNOR, 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs .s>-lir; K. Sudweeks and Deanna Sudweeks, by and through 
counsel, Brett C v.; .» *, ; - - .. . iV.^i . -.1- .-j i ', , • <u tU omplam against 
the Defendants at • ••' •.' ::-..'1 'HCLV as follows: 
1. "he Plaintiffs are incljv lduals residing in Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendants Maria Angelica Sanchez, Miguel David Ge . , :.nny 
-v r ~'<Rt 
MAY 2 I 2001 
MPLAINT 
^(•/Affd 
i - -
i 
Ray O' 'Com 101 ai id I"\ lai tha () ' Connoi ai e indi idi lals i: esidii lg Ii: 11 Jtah C :>i n it;; 
State of Utah. 
3 Plaintiffs own two parcels of real property in Pleasant Grove I u>. Lu... - x.-unty, 
State of I Jtah (the " "Si idv reeks I 'roper t) "). 01 le • pai eel v ' !f scribed in uie 
Warranty Deed from Joseph Best and Ehunne P. B J M i^ PiaiPlitfs, dated June 2 1 . 
i]
 •- Kecords of the Utah County Recorder's Office, and the second parcel which is 
described in the Warranty Deed from Boyd M. Collings and Geraldine L, Collings 
of the Records of the Utah County Recorder's < )ffice. A copy of each of these 
Deeds is attacu^ hereto as Exhibit "Ar and Exhibit "B" to this Con lplaint 
4. " ;; \ \ r e been the sole and exclusive owners of the above described 
parcels since they purchased the same in 1972, 
pareH of real proper! v in Pleasant Grove C'n\ < our.n ot Utah, State of- Utah (Uie 
"( * -i?:.x . Proper;, . . . u.u,u: ,!,., - . :. J ca.,i ^.... _ .. 
Sanchez Property as described in the WaiTanty Deed from Susan S. Hardinger to 
Defendants O'Connor dated August1 ° 1 9 9 4 as Entry No . 64616, Book 3507 and 
Pages «H,") ^ ami S •(Hml (Jit1 I(n nm ih i» :ah C :)i n it;; R ecoi dei 's Offic- 5 ,!| • :• : p;; ' 
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of the Deed is attached hei eto as Exhibit " "C 
6. Defendant Maria Angelica Sanchez owns property in Pleasant Grove City, County 
of Utah, State of I Jtah (the "Sanchez Property ") , vv hich is dest. A>^ .L . . 
( laui i I )eed from Mij'.m'l I ,:<ivii"il (unit h I In 1,1 Z"1 ii|',Hicn Sanchez dated October 
8, 2000 and recorded Octobu ' : 999 as Knt r V ' ; 2433 , Book 524- and 
Pages <• >- ' . . i, i-v^u;.: ,. • • * i 
this D e e d is at tached hereto as Exhibi t " D " to this Complain t . 
7. The Sanchez Property contains two separate parts, one part which is 
ttpjiuiAiiiiiilcly t I l i d \ 'nk ,iii(l hi s du'cifh, 1)1 I sr< in \\w Sudweeks Properly m 
the east, and the O'Connor Property on the west, and the second part which lies 
directly to the south of the <) < omui; Property. 
8. Tin Siinrluv Piopi rh w In* li i\ approximately 33 feet wide and lies directly 
between the Sudweeks Property and the O'Connor Property is the subject of this 
action. 
9# B 0 t h par t s o f the Sanchez Proper ty and tin* (>'• u r n m Property were p a n of a 
larger tract of land which was owneo • -. • •". ; C I K : J ; , U predecessors .;* m i c * 
een the O'Connor Property on the west and the Sanchez 
Property on the east is marked by a fence and driveway, which have both been in 
existence for a lun^ dun , and1 I he (n i i c u as a n led h • I'H' I'l.rulifts slu»rth , h " 
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the purchase of their parcels in 1.972. 
11, I lit1 \ oiiespoiHhn|» (tumid.ii y Inn1 svlncli r. ni.uknl l»v the (nice and driveway, has 
been recognized and treated hv the parties and their predecessors in interest as the 
boundary between the Sanchc^ i iuperty on the west ai id the Plaintiffs' p i Dpei t) 
IM) t'n'«' i -I »•'"' »* l*>71 win *\ i'hintiffs purchased their two parcels which are 
above described. 
12 •.-. - i-.ii..,;: • ..ave reasonat/^ . . • •• * e 
fence ancj driveway line since they purchased their parceK in 1 ^~2, and ine\ Ihr. 
continued to use and occupy the same since that time, and have planter -.- trppc 
grass, plai its, ai id ha1 e laid an asphalt pad • ;:: n the sai ne 
x J. Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez did 
knowingly and intentionally drive a wrecking d uck upon ,nul - In) pat kiln s.inr ' ii 
the riainfiffV prnpcrl1, direr tlv in front of the Plaintiffs' motor home. 
'.'The parking of theW-ecking truck does prohibit the Plaintiffs from using their 
I Notwithstanding the demands from Plaintiffs to Defendants Miguel David Gedo, 
James ^^ io and Maria Angelica Sanchez, .•.-. . „ ,c • ' ; 
ren iov* ;d in >m in front of Plaintiffs' motor home, said Defendants have ieluded io 
remove the wrecking truck from in front of Plaintiffs' motor home. 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Boundary by Acquiescence) 
16. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this 
reference. 
17. Plaintiffs have occupied their respective property and treated it as their own up to 
the line which is marked by a fence and driveway on the east side of the parcel 
which is now owned by the Defendant Sanchez, and Plaintiffs have so occupied 
the same continuously since 1972. 
18. Defendants or their predecessors in interest have occupied their respective 
property only up to and on the east side of the fence, driveway and corresponding 
line, which fence, driveway and corresponding line are located on the east side of 
the property now owned by Defendant Sanchez. 
19. The parties and their predecessors in interest have acquiesced in the boundary 
line, which is marked by the fence and driveway, as the boundary between the 
parcel which is now owed by the Defendant Sanchez and the parcel which is now 
owned by the Plaintiffs. 
20. The Plaintiffs and Defendant Sanchez are adjoining landowners, as were Plaintiffs 
and Defendant Sanchez' predecessors in interest. 
21. Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of the Court determining that the fence, driveway 
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and corresponding line on the east side of the Sanchez Property, above described, 
is the boundary between the smaller Sanchez Property and the Sudweeks Property. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Prescriptive Easement) 
22. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this 
reference. 
23. Plaintiffs have openly used and occupied the subject property which is described 
in paragraph 8 above and have treated it as their own up to the line which is 
marked by a fence and driveway on the east side of the parcel which is now 
owned by Defendant Sanchez, and Plaintiffs have so occupied the same 
continuously since 1972. 
24. During Plaintiffs' use and occupation of the subject property, Plaintiffs have 
erected a fence, planted trees, grass and plants, and have constructed an asphalt 
pad on the subject property and used the same to park their motor home. 
25. Plaintiffs' use of the subject property has at all times been adverse to the 
Defendants and their predecessors in interest. 
26. Plaintiffs' use of the subject property has at all times been notorious. 
27. In the alternative to the Boundary by Acquiescence claim, Plaintiffs are entitled to 
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a decree of the Court determining that the Plaintiffs have a prescriptive easement 
in the subject property which runs with the same, and that said prescriptive 
easement shall include all of the subject property up to the fence and driveway 
line on the east side of the same, and it shall provide for the use of parking 
vehicles, growing and maintaining plants, trees and grass, and other typical and 
general uses. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Trespass by Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez) 
28. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this 
reference. 
29. Defendants Miguel David Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez have acted in such a 
manner as to damage the Plaintiffs' property, and have prohibited them from the 
quiet use and enjoyment of the same. 
30. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James 
Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez for damages and for injury to Plaintiffs' 
property in an amount to be shown at trial. 
31. Plaintiffs are also entitled to punitive damages as a result of Defendant Miguel 
David Gedo's, Defendant James Gedo's, and Defendant Maria Angelica Sanchez' 
7 
intentional trespass on Plaintiffs' property with knowing and intentional disregard 
for Plaintiffs' rights therein, in an amount to be determined at trial. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Forcible Detainer by Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez) 
32. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this 
reference. 
33. Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez did 
unlawfully enter a portion of Plaintiffs' property in Plaintiffs' absence and have 
excluded Plaintiffs from possession of the portion of Plaintiffs' property by 
parking a wrecking truck or causing the same to be parked on Plaintiffs' property 
between Plaintiffs' motor home and the public street. 
34. The actions of Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica 
Sanchez have damaged the Plaintiffs and have prohibited them from the quiet use 
and enjoyment of their property. 
35. Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez have 
refused to surrender Plaintiffs' property being unlawfully occupied by said 
Defendants after demand was made on said Defendants for the surrender of the 
premises unlawfully entered. 
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36. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James 
Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez for damages arising from said Defendants' 
forcible detainer in an amount to be shown at trial. 
37. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10, Plaintiffs are entitled to have their 
damages against Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria 
Angelica Sanchez for forcible detainer trebled in an amount to be shown at trial. 
38. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10.5, Plaintiffs are entitled to an order of 
restitution directing Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria 
Angelica Sanchez to vacate that portion of Plaintiffs' property being unlawfully 
occupied by said Defendants and to remove all property of said Defendants and to 
restore said premises to Plaintiffs or be forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Injunction) 
39. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by this 
reference. 
40. Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief permanently enjoining the Defendants 
from occupying or trespassing on Plaintiffs' property. 
41. Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief directing Defendants Miguel David 
9 
Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez to remove from Plaintiffs' 
property the recking truck and any other property placed on Plaintiffs' property by 
or under the direction of said Defendants. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs John R. Sudweeks and Deanna Sudweeks pray for judgment 
against the Defendants as follows: 
1. On the First Cause of Action hereof quieting title in Plaintiffs to all property west 
of the boundary fence and driveway on the basis of boundary by acquiescence. 
2. On the Second Cause of Action in the alternative, declaring a prescriptive 
easement in Plaintiffs to all property west of the fence and driveway for use of 
parking vehicles, growing and maintaining trees, plants and grass, and other 
typical and general uses. 
3. On the Third Cause of Action hereof for actual and punitive damages against 
Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez in an 
amount to be shown at trial. 
4. On the Fourth Cause of Action hereof for trebled damages against Defendants 
Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez in an amount to be 
determined at trial, and an order of restitution directing Defendants Miguel David 
Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez to vacate that portion of the 
subject property being unlawfully occupied by said Defendants and to restore said 
10 
premises to Plaintiffs. 
5. On the Fifth Cause of Action hereof an injunction permanently enjoining 
Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica Sanchez from 
occupying or trespassing on the subject property and directing said Defendants to 
remove from said property the wrecking truck and any other property placed on 
said property by or under the direction of said Defendants. 
6. For Plaintiffs' costs and attorney fees incurred herein. 
7. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
DATED t h i s J y d a y of April, 2001. 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
BRETT C. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs' Address: 
c/o Brett C. Anderson, Esq. 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
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Exhibit "F" 
Order and Judgment 
COP 
Brett C. Anderson, Bar No. 8134 
WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
JOHN R. SUDWEEKS, and 
DEANNA SUDWEEKS 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, 
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, 
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and MARTHA 
O'CONNOR, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 01-0402488 
Judge: James R. Taylor 
On December 15 and 16, 2003, a trial was conducted in the above-mentioned matter, the 
Honorable James R. Taylor presiding. Plaintiffs, John R. Sudweeks and Deanna Sudweeks, 
appeared in person and were represented by counsel of record, Brett C. Anderson, WITT 
MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C. Defendants Maria Angelica Sanchez, Miguel David Gedo, 
BLED 
Fourth Judicial Disfnrt r v of I hah r~ x L"^inct C-our t 
^ C o u n t y «tate of Utah 
OeniA) *« 
q6{ 
i 
James Gedo, Johnny Ray O'Connor, and Martha O'Connor appeared in person,pro se. The 
Court heard evidence from the parties. 
The Court, having reviewed the file, and being otherwise fully apprized in the matter, 
hereby makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The Court finds John B. Stahl's testimony convincing and therefore adopts Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit #1. 
2. The Court finds that the deed of distribution of the estate of Ivadell Tomlinson in 1972 
contained an erroneous legal description. The decree mistakenly located the east line of 
lot 11 (parcel 1-40-440011) westward 33 feet from its correct position. 
3. This mistake shifted the west boundary of the estate of Ivadell Tomlinson by 33 feet. 
4. The estate of Ivadell Tomlinson was subsequently divided into real property consisting of 
four parcels or lots, to wit: (1) lot 16 (parcel 1-40-440016), (2) lot 13 (parcel 1-40-
440013), (3) lot 14 (parcel 1-40-440014), and (4) lot 15 (parcel 1-40-440015). The legal 
descriptions of the above-mentioned lots perpetuated the error in paragraph 3, shifting the 
legal descriptions of these properties westward 33 feet. 
5. The error was propagated into legal descriptions of adjoining real property, including lot 
11 (parcel 1-40-440011) and lot 12 (parcel 1-40-440012) to the East, and lots 57 (parcel 
1-40-440057), 52 (parcel 1-40-440052), and 58 (parcel 1-40-440058) to the West of the 
former Ivadell Tomlinson estate. 
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6. Modifications were subsequently made to the descriptions of lot 57 (parcel 1-40-
440057), lot 52 (parcel 1-40-440052), and lot 58 (parcel 1-40-440058) which altered the 
boundary lines by agreements, surveys, and deed exchanges. 
7. Even though the boundaries between lot 16 (parcel 1-40-440016) and lot 57 (parcel 1-40-
440057) are contiguous, the modifications mentioned in paragraph 6 purported to create a 
new parcel of 33 feet in width between lots 16 and 57. This purported parcel is referred 
to as lot 59 (parcel 1-40-440059) in the records of the Utah County Recorder. 
8. Defendants Maria Angelica Sanchez, Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo claimed an 
interest in the 33-foot wide parcel of real property known as lot 59 (parcel 1-40-440059) 
in the Utah County Recorder's Office. 
9. The Court finds that lot 59 (parcel 1-40-440059), as described in the records of the Utah 
County Recorder, does not exist and that the county records are in error. 
10. The Court finds that the metes and bounds description prepared by John B. Stahl, of the 
disputed parcel (referred to in the Utah County Recorder's Office as lot 59 or parcel 1-
40-440059), in addition to that of lots 13 and 16 (indisputably owned by Plaintiffs), 
describes exactly the two lots purchased by Plaintiffs approximately thirty years ago. 
11. Therefore, the Court finds that Title should be quieted in Plaintiffs John and Deanna 
Sudweeks in real property referred to in paragraph 10 and more particularly described as 
follows: 
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Commencing at the North Quarter corner of Section 27, Township 5 South, 
Range 2 East, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence South 729.55 feet 
(South 729.35 feet and 730.08 feet by record and South 00°05'49" East by 
Utah County State Plane Coordinate System) along the section line and 
North 89°39'57" East 33.00 feet (East 33.0 feet by record) to a point on the 
east line of 1500 East Street and the south line of Battle Creek Drive, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah; thence continuing along the south line of said Battle 
Creek Drive North 89°39f57" East 356.74 feet (North 89°05f East 356.74 
feet by record) to the northeast comer of that certain parcel originally 
described in Book 1241 at Page 262 as Entry 13592:1971 in the office of the 
Utah County Recorder, said northeast comer being the True Point of 
Beginning of the herein described parcel; and running thence and continuing 
along said south line of Battle Creek Drive North 89°39,57" East 171.24 feet 
(North 89 05' East 171.26 feet by record) to the northwest comer of that 
certain parcel originally described in Book 672 at Page 511 as Entry 
1276:1955 said comer being common with that certain parcel described in a 
Quit Claim Deed as Entry 35258:2003 recorded March 10, 2003, said comer 
also being South 89°39f57" West 176.74 feet from that certain fence comer 
originally described in Book 672 at Page 511 as Entry 1276:1955 and as 
described in those certain Boundary Line Agreements recorded in Book 
2275 at Page 838 as Entry 1746:1986 and in Book 2966 at Page 465 as 
Entry 35388:1992; thence South 00°00'07" East 132.90 feet (South 0°13f 
West 132.90 feet by record) along the west line of said parcel originally 
described in Book 672 at Page 511 as Entry 1276:1955; thence South 
89°01,32" West 153.35 feet (South 89°05' West 171.27 feet by record) to the 
southwest comer of said parcel originally described in Book 1241 at Page 
262 as Entry 13592:1971, said southwest comer being North 89°01'32" 
Eastl 80.02 feet (North 89°05' East 180 feet by record) from the southeast 
comer of that certain parcel originally described in Book 679 at Page 617 as 
Entry 5772:1955; thence North 00°03f00" East 134.81 feet (North 0°16f East 
132.90 feet by record) to the True Point of Beginning. 
12. Title to this real property being quieted in the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the issue 
boundary by acquiescence is therefore moot. 
13. The issue of prescriptive easement is similarly moot. 
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14. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' claim for forcible detainer should be dismissed based on 
Plaintiffs own motion. 
15. The Court finds that Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria Angelica 
Sanchez claimed rightful use of the disputed parcel, and as a result, the Plaintiffs' claim 
for trespass should be denied. 
16. Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo violated the Temporary Restraining 
Order and Preliminary Injunction, which were entered by this Court on or about 
September 6, 2001, by placing threatening telephone calls to Plaintiffs on or about June 
24, 2003 and June 26, 2003. 
17. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden with regards to Rule 65A 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and, as a result, Defendants Miguel David Gedo and 
James Gedo are permanently restrained and enjoined from using, occupying or 
trespassing on Plaintiffs real property, including the real property described in paragraph 
11, herein, and from having any contact with Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' family members. 
18. Plaintiffs incurred $14,182.70 in reasonable attorney fees and costs, as testified to by 
Plaintiffs' attorney, Brett C. Anderson of WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C., in the 
Affidavit of Brett C. Anderson. Accordingly, Plaintiffs should be awarded $14,182.70 
for their attorney fees and costs included herein, and judgment should be entered against 
Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo in the amount of $14,182.70. 
Based on the above, and for good cause showing, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The records of the Utah I utility Rixonki shall he niiTeclal in rnnl'nrmance to the survey 
performed by John B. Stahl (Plaintiffs Exhibit #1) to show that lot 59 (parcel 1-40-
440059) does not exist. 
2. Title to the disputed VV ionl vvute parcel of real property - former lot 59 (parcel 1 -40 
440059) - is quieted in John and Deanna Sudweeks, as part of the following described 
real property: 
Commencing at the North Quarter corner of Section 27, Township 5 South, 
Range 2 East, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence South 729.55 feet 
(South 729.35 feet and 730.08 feet by record and South 00°05'49" East by Utah 
County State Plane Coordinate System) along the section line and North 
89°39'57" East 33.00 feet (East 33.0 feet by record) to a point on the east line of 
1500 East Street and the south line of Battle Creek Drive, Pleasant Grove, Utah; 
thence continuing along the south line of said Battle Creek Drive North 89°39,57" 
East 356.74 feet (North 89°05f East 356.74 feet by record) to the northeast corner 
of that certain parcel originally described in Book 1241 at Page 262 as Entry 
13592:1971 in the office of the Utah County Recorder, said northeast corner 
being the True Point of Beginning of the herein described parcel; and running 
thence and continuing along said south line of Battle Creek Drive North 
89°39'57" East 171.24 feet (North 89°05' East 171.26 feet by record) to the 
northwest corner of that certain parcel originally described in Book 672 at Page 
511 as Entry 1276:1955 said corner being common with that certain parcel 
described in a Quit Claim Deed as Entry 35258:2003 recorded March 10, 2003, 
said corner also being South 89°39'57ff West 176.74 feet from that certain fence 
corner originally described in Book 672 at Page 511 as Entry 1276:1955 and as 
described in those certain Boundary Line Agreements recorded in Book 2275 at 
Page 838 as Entry 1746:1986 and in Book 2966 at Page 465 as Entry 35388:1992; 
thence South 00o00,07" East 132.90 feet (South 0°13' West 132.90 feet by record) 
along the west line of said parcel originally described in Book 672 at Page 511 as 
Entry 1276:1955; thence South 89°0r32" West 153.35 feet (South 89°05' West 
171.27 feet by record) to the southwest corner of said parcel originally described 
in Book 1241 at Page 262 as Entry 13592:1971, said southwest corner being 
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North 89o0r32" Eastl 80.02 feet (North 89°05' East 180 feet by record) from the 
southeast comer of that certain parcel originally described in Book 679 at Page 
617 as Entry 5772:1955; thence North 00°03'00" East 134.81 feet (North 0°16' 
East 132.90 feet by record) to the True Point of Beginning. 
3. Plaintiffs John and Deanna Sudweeks own lots 13 (parcel 1-40-440013) and 16 (parcel 1-
40-440016) up to the western boundary of lot 57 (parcel 1-40-440057), more particularly 
described in paragraph 2 of this Order. 
4. Plaintiffs' claim for forcible detainer is dismissed on Plaintiffs' own motion. 
5. Plaintiffs' claim against Defendants Miguel David Gedo, James Gedo and Maria 
Angelica Sanchez for trespass is denied. 
6. Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are permanently restrained and enjoined 
from using, entering, occupying, trespassing on, or otherwise interfering with Plaintiffs' 
quiet use and enjoyment of their real property, including the real property described in 
paragraph 2 of this Order 
7. Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are permanently restrained and enjoined 
from contacting, annoying, harassing, harming, or otherwise communicating directly or 
indirectly with Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' family members. 
8. Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo shall pay Plaintiffs attorney fees and 
costs in the amount of $14,182.70. 
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DATED this 5 day of (/M~\ 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
/S/ JAMES R.TAYLOR 
James R. Taylor 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE 
To: James Gedo, Miguel David Gedo, Maria Angelica Sanchez, Johnny Ray O'Connor, 
Martha O'Connor; Defendants, 
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Plaintiffs will submit the above and 
foregoing ORDER & JUDGMENT to the Fourth District Court in and for Utah County for 
signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for 
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration. 
,2004. DATED thij? day of j ^ W 
WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C. 
BRETT C. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT, postage prepaid by first-class mail, on this jlp-ff/ day of ibiyjui 2004, 
to the following: ' (7 
Maria Angelica Sanchez 
361 West 800 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Miguel David Gedo 
PO Box 970002 
Orem, Utah 84097 
Miguel David Gedo 
361 West 800 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
James Gedo 
361 West 800 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Johnny Ray O'Connor 
1640 East Battlecreek Dr. 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Martha Ray O'Connor 
1640 East Battlecreek Dr. 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
John and Deanna Sudweeks 
1610 East 200 South 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Le^al Assistant 
Exhibit "G" 
Deeds- Geddo 
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: 
Miguel David Gedo 
164CJ East 200 South 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
UTAH COUNTY RECORDER 
1999 Oct 12 9:09 « FEE 16.00 BY SS 
Ecnao FW EQUITY TIILE AGENCY M 
WARRANTY DEED 
ALANR.STRASBUR6 grantors) 
of Pleasant Grove, County of Utah State of UT hereby 
Convey and Warrant to 
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO 
of PJeasant Grove, County of Utah, State of Utah grantee(s) 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration 
the following described tract of land in Utah County, State of UTAH, to wit: 
PARCEL2: SEE ATTACHEDEXHTBIT "A" 
SidweU No. 14:044:0059 
Subject to covenants, conditions and restrictions of record. 
;, this of WITNESS, the hands of said grantors, 
Signed in the presence of 
ALJANR.STRASBURG f > ^ 
October 1999, A.D. 
SIpitiOF UTAH ) 
:ss 
CCfUNTYOFUTAH ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this day of 1 9 ^ .bv 
A\nn L^m. IfrbflTfl-
My Commission Expires: j ^ . $«Z0Ol 
rv Public V 
Uul^MiAAwt^ 
,Notajry Public' 
Residing in: £ > # i ^ \jjir 
A RACQUEL HARVARD 
mTmPUBUG*STA!Eo(UTAR[ 
225 EAST 830 SOUTH J 
OREM.UTAHS4058 
COMM.EXR 12-8-200! 
E x k l B I i 'A _
 M 
1
 M 1 0 9 6 8 0 W 5 2 * 1 * 2© 
PARCEL 2 
COMMENCING AT A POINT ON SOUTH SIDE OF BATTLE CREEK DRIVE PLEASANT GROVE, UTAH 
THENCE NORTH 89 DEG. 59' WEST A L U G THE SECTION LINE 2075 10 FEET AND SOUTH 720 02 FEET 
FROM THE NORTI LEAST CORNER OF kcTION 27 TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 2 EAST SALT LAKE 
BASE AND MERIDIAN THENCE SOUTH 29* WEST ALONG A RETAINING WALL AND WELL EXTENDED 
146 85 FEET, THENCE NORTH 89 DEG J05' EAST 70 J 9 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 14 DEG 44* EAST 119 29 
FEET. THENCE SOUTH 89 DEG 55' W&Y'l84 91 FEET, THENCE NORTH 13 EAST 260 FEET, THENCE 
NORTH 89 DEG 05' EAST 84 45 FEET JO BEGINNING 
ISS A ND EXCEPT INC 
COMMENCING AT THE
 N0RTHEAST doRNER OF SECTION 27, TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 2 EAST, 
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, THENCE SOUTH 0 DEG 2T58" EAST ALONG THE SECTION LINE 
1382 51 FEET THENCE NORTH 89 DECa 49'36* WEST ALONG THE ONE-SDCTEENTH SECTION LINE 
1386 88 FEET, THENCE NORTH I DEG 45'27" WEST ALONG A FENCE LINE 37 88 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 
89 DEG ->4'56" WEST 4">9 15 FEET, tKENCE SOUTH 89 DEG 13'32M WEST ALONG THE .NORTH 
BOUNDARY OF PLAT MC" TIMP RIDGE ESTATES 879 J 7 FEET. THENCE NORTH O DEG 05'48M WEST 
ALONG THE ONE-QUARTER SECTION LINE 468 22 FEET. THENCE NORTH 88 DEG 32'53" EAST 
PARTIALLY ALONG A FENCE LINE 562 53 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 0 DEG 12'46" EAST 132 75 FEET, 
THENCE NORTH 89 DEG 29'14' EAST 184 19 FEET, THENCE NORTH 15 DEG 09M6" WEST 119J29 FEET 
THENCE NORTH 8 DEG 06'L2W EAST XLONG* A FENCE LINE 148 31 FEET, THENCE NORTH 88 DEG 
39' 14" EAST 204 56 FEET, THENCE NORTtf^2 DEG 00' 13" WEST 69 49 FEET. THENCE NORTH 48 DEG 
15* EAST 172 00 FEET THENCE NORTH, 64 DEG 45 EAST 405 50 FEET. THENCE NORTH 19 DEG 57' 
EAST 73 26 FEET, THENCE NORTH 17 DEG 20'46" WEST_85 20 FEET, THENCE NORTH 42 DEG 46*14" 
EAST 304 90 FEET, THENCE NORTH 89 DEG 35'06' FAST ALONG THE SECTION I 1TNF 1045 29 FEET T© 
THE POINT OF BEGINNING 
ALSO LESS AND EXCEPTING 
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON A FENCE'cORNER, AT A POINT ON THE BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 
AS RECORDED IN BOOK 2275-OF-848,,SAID POINT BEING SOUTH 89 DEG 35,07' WEST 1949 10 FEET 
ALONG SECTION LINE AND SOUTH 729 23 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION 27, 
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 2 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, THENCE SOUTH 8 DEG. 
06'12" WEST 14831 FEET ALONG A FENCE LINE THENCE SOUTH 89 DEG 59*43" WEST 71 61 FEET 
ALONG A FENCE LINE. THENCE NORTH 0 DEG 05'19M EAST 146 13 FEET ALONG A FENCE LINE, 
THENCE NORTH 89 DEG 33 >35M EAST 92 30 FEET ALONG A FENCE LINE TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING 
Al SO I ESS AND EXCEPT ING 
I 
BEGINNING AT A FENCE CORNER Obj THE SOUTH SIDE OF 200 SOUTH STR£ET (BATTLE CREEK 
DRIVE), PLEASANT GROVE, UTAH, WHICH POINT IS SOUTH 89°15 I4M WEST ALONG THE SECTION 
LINE 2041 40 FEET AND SOUTH 72935 FEET (BASED ON THE UTAH STATE COORDINATE SYSTEM, 
CENTRAL ZONE AND DATA PUBLISHED BY THE UTAH COUNTY SURVEYOR AS OF JANUARY 1986) 
FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION 27, TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 2 EAST, SALT LAKE 
BASE AND MERIDIAN. THENCE SOUTH 00o0ri9" WEST 137 87 FEET ALONG A FENCE LINE AS 
DESCRIBED IN A FENCE LINE BOUNDARY AGREEMENT ENTRY NO 35388-92, BOOK 2966, PAGE 465, 
THENCE SOUTH 89o2T00" WEST 82 56 F^ETTO A POINT ON A BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT ENTRY 
NO 1746-86, BOOK 2275 PAGE 848, THENCE NORTH 00°12'46" WEST ALONG SAID BOUNDARY LINE 
AGREEMENT 8.63 FEET. THENCE SOUTH 88°32'53H WEST CONTINUING ALONG SAID BOUNDARY LINE 
AGREEMENT 0 50 FEET TO A FENCE LINE, THENCE NORTH 00°36'30" WEST 129 53 FEET TO THE 
SOUTH SIDE OF SAID 200 SOUTH STREEf, THENCE NORTH 89°33,35M EAST ALONG SAID STREET 84 63 
FFET TO THE POINT OF BFGINNING 
ALSO LESS AND EXCEPTING 
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON A BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT ENTRY NO 1746-86 BOOK 2275, PAGE 
848, WHICH POINT IS SOUTH 89°35'14" V^EST ALONG THE SECTION LINE 1970 01 FEET AND SOUTH 
875 99 FEET (BASED ON THE UTAH STATE COORDINATE SYSTEM. CENTRAL ZONE AND DATA 
PUBLISHED BY THE UTAH COUNTY SURVEYOR AS OF JANUARY 1986) FROM THE NORTHEAST 
CORNER OF SECTION 27, TOWNSHIP 5 SbUTH, RANGE 2 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, 
THENCE SOUTH 15°09'46" EAST ALONG L\ID BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 119 29 FEET THENCE 
SOUTH 89029,I4,, WEST CONTINUING A'^QNG SAID BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 184 91 FEET, 
THENCE NORTH 00°12'46" WEST CONTINUING ALONG SAID BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 124 12 
FEET. THENCE NORTH 89o22,00M EAST 82.56 FEET TO A FENCE LINE AS DESCRIBED IN A FENCE 
LINE BOUNDARY AGREEMENT ENTRY NO 35388-92, BOOK 2966, PAGE 465 THENCE SOUTH 00°05' I9" 
WEST 8 25 FEET ALONG A TENCE LINE AS DESCRIBED IN SAID BOUNDARY AGREEMENT TO A 
FENCE LINE. THENCE NORTH 89°59,43,# EAST 7161 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE AS DESCRIBED 
IN SAID BOUNDARY AGREEMENT. TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING 
Mail x Notice to 
Grdntee
 ^Ai^Jiftse58ft|SH 
UTAH COUNTY RECORDER 
ACCOMMODATION g g £ &,3§5iR &i'&K ft 
File No. 
QU t 1 I AIM HI* Ml 
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, Grantors 
of Pleasant Grove Ut ih toun1' State of Utah hereby QUIT-CLAIMS 
to 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, Grantees 
of Pleasant Grove County oi Utah State of Utah 
for the sura of TEN DOLLARS AND NO CENTS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE 
CONSIDERATION 
the follow! nq described tract of land m Utah County, State 
Utah 
SEL AfJACHED EXHIBIT "A" 
WITNESS, the hand of 3did=Sa?anJLQi^this y day of Oct obi. 
1999 ^ ^ ^ 
COUNTY OF UTAH I 
STATE OF UTAH j 
, SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to b 
October, 1999, by MIGUEL DAVID GEJ« 
instrument, who duly acknowledge 
same. 
.1-' 
Dfl 1 1 8 4 4 3 K 5 2 4 8 W 6 5 5 
EXHIBIT "AH 
PARCEL I. 
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON A BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT ENTRY NO. 1746-86. BOOK 2275. PAGE 
848, WHICH POfNT IS SOUTH 89M5-|4" WEST ALONG THE SECTION LINE 1970.01 FEET AND SOUTH 
875.99 FEET (BASED ON THE UTAH STATE COORDINATE SYSTEM. CENTRAL ZONE AND DATA 
PUBLISHED BY THE UTAH COUNTY SURVEYOR AS OF JANUARY 1986) FROM THE NORTHEAST 
CORNER OF SECTION 27. TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH. RANGE 2 EAST. SALT LAKE BASE AND MERJDUN; 
THENCE SOUTH 15*09*46- EAST ALONG SAID BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 119.29 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH 89*2914- WEST CONTINUING ALONG SAID BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 184.91 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 00*12*46" WEST CONTINUING ALONG SAID BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 124.12 
FEET. THENCE NORTH 89*22*00" EAST 82.56 FEET TO A FENCE LINE AS DESCRIBED TN A FENCE 
LINE BOUNDARY AGREEMENT ENTRY NO. 35388-92. BOOK 2966. PAGE 465. THENCE SOUTH 00*05'19" 
WEST 8.25 FEET ALONG A FENCE LINE AS DESCRIBED IN SAID BOUNDARY AGREEMENT, TO A 
FENCE LINE; THENCE NORTH 89*59'43" EAST 71.61 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE AS DESCRIBED, 
W SAID BOUNDARY AGREEMENT. TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
ty+OW-im&t 
Exhibit "ir 
Summons 
BRETT C. ANDERSON, Bar No. 8134 
GORDON W. DUVAL, Bar No. 6532 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601 
JOHN R. SUDWEEKS and 
DEANNA SUDWEEKS, 
Plaintiffs, SUMMONS 
vs. 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, 
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, 
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and 
MARTHA O'CONNOR 
Defendant. 
Casr No. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: MIGUEL DAVID GEDO 
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required, within 70 days of service ot thr, 
summons upon you, to iile v, llh the Fourth District Court clerk at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601, 
a written answer to the attached complaint and to mail a copy to the plaintiffs attorney If you fail to do 
so, judgment by default will be taken af>auiit upon ioi the relief demanded in said complaint which is on 
file with the court. 
DATED this W day of May, 20u l 
DUVAL HANSEN W i n <fc MORLEY, PC. 
BRETT C. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
SLR VE DEFEND AN i 
BRETT C. ANDERSON, Bar No. 8134 
GORDON W. DUVAL, Bar No. 6532 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601 
JOHN R. SUDWEEKS and 
DEANNA SUDWEEKS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, 
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, 
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and 
MARTHA O' CONNOR 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: JAMES GEDO 
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required, within 20 days of service of this 
summons upon you, to file with the Fourth District Court clerk at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601, 
a written answer to the attached complaiiit and to mail a copy to the plaintiffs attorney. If you fail to do 
so, judgment by default will be taken against upon for the relief demanded in said complaint which is on 
file with the court. . 
DATED this U_ day of May, 2001. 
DUVAL HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
BRETT C. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
SERVE DEFENDANT-
SUMMONS 
Case No. 
BRETT C. ANDERSON, Bar No. 8134 
GORDON W. DUVAL, Bar No. 6532 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601 
JOHN R. SUDWEEKS and 
DEANNA SUDWEEKS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, 
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, 
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and 
MARTHA O'CONNOR 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ 
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required, within 20 days of service of this 
summons upon you, to file with the Fourth District Court clerk at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601, 
a written answer to the attached complaint and to mail a copy to the plaintifFs attorney. If you fail to do 
so, judgment by default will be taken against upon for the relief demanded in said complaint which is on 
file with the court. 
DATED thisVT. day of May, 2001 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
BRETT C. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
SERVE DEFENDANT: 
SUMMONS 
Case No. 
Exhibit "I" 
Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause 
RECEIVED 
JUL I 5 im 
BRETT C. ANDERSON (8134) 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
306 West Main 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
TELEPHONE: (801) 756-7658 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN R. SUDWEEKS, and 
DEANNA SUDWEEKS, ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, 
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, ] 
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, 
Defendants. 
) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
1 Civil No. 01-0402488 
1 Judge: District #7 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff John R. Sudweeks' Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The Court has reviewed the motion, and the 
affidavit in support thereof, and from the matters submitted, the Court hereby finds: 
1. This dispute appears to be a dispute involving threats made by Defendants Miguel 
David Gedo and James Gedo against Plaintiff John R. Sudweeks, his wife and 
1 
family, and that the threats appear to be threats of imminent physical violence and 
death against Mr. Sudweeks, his wife and family. 
2. This dispute also appears to be a dispute involving the blocking of a large 
wrecking truck in front of the Plaintiffs' motor home for a period of many days, 
which prohibited the Plaintiffs' from the use of their motor home. 
3. That from the parties' pleadings filed in this case, this Court has jurisdiction over 
the subject matter as well as personal jurisdiction over the parties. 
4. It appears that on or about 7/2/01, Plaintiff John R. Sudweeks was working in his 
back yard at 1610 East 200 South, Pleasant Grove, Utah when he was approached 
by Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo (Gedos), and his health and 
life were imminently threatened by the Gedos, as well as the health and life of Mr. 
Sudweeks' wife and family, and that these threats may be related to the pending 
quiet title action which the Plaintiffs have filed against the Gedos and their 
mother. 
5. It appears that the Gedos have recently parked a large wrecking truck in front of 
the Plaintiffs' motor home which was a few feet away from the Plaintiffs' home, 
and that this prohibited the Plaintiffs from the use of their motor home for many 
days. 
2 
6. It appears, based on the alleged threats and actions of the Gedos which are 
described in the Affidavit of John R. Sudweeks in Support of Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order, that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or 
damage will result to John R. Sudweeks, his wife, Deanna Sudweeks, and their 
immediate family members before the Defendants, Miguel David Gedo and James 
Gedo, are heard on this matter. 
7. That it appears that the Defendants, Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo, will not 
suffer cost, attorney fees or damage as the result of this injunction, and the Court 
therefore dispenses with the requirement of security. 
Based upon the above, and good cause appearing, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
8. Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are temporarily restrained and 
enjoined from entering Plaintiffs' real property located at: 1610 East 200 South, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, including the thirty three foot wide parcel which is 
described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Plaintiffs' Complaint in this case, and from 
blocking or otherwise interfering with Plaintiffs' quiet use and enjoyment of said 
real property, unless and until further order of this Court. 
3 
9. Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are further restrained and 
enjoined from contacting, annoying, harassing, harming, or otherwise 
communicating directly or indirectly with the Plaintiffs and their immediate 
family members, unless and until further order of this Court. 
DEFENDANTS MIGUEL DAVID GEDO AND JAMES GEDO ARE FURTHER 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED to appear and show cause, if any they have, why this 
Temporary Restraining Order should not be converted to a preliminary injunction and continued 
during the pendency of this action, on '{\\)a S[ 2001, at the hour of \Q \cj Cu^, at the 
Fourth District Courthouse, Provo Department, 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah, Room \ j ^ . 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that no security is required 
for the issuance of this Temporary Restraining Order. The Court will, however, reconsider the 
issue of security at the time of the preliminary injunction hearing set forth above. 
DATED this ^2 /day of July, 2001. //- *&D $* iAA 
BY THE COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the <?^raay of July, 2001, a true and correct copy of the within 
and foregoing TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE was 
mailed, via United States Postal Service, first class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Miguel David Gedo 
361 West 800 North 
Provo, Utah 84061 
James Gedo 
361 West 800 North 
Provo, Utah 84061 
— ^ 1 
ttd&.aJk^ 
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Exhibit "J" 
Order and Preliminary Injunction 
Brett C. Anderson, (8134) 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
TELEPHONE: (801) 756-7658 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
JOHN R. SUDWEEKS, and 
DEANNA SUDWEEKS, ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, ; 
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, 
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and ] 
MARTHA O'CONNOR. 
Defendants. 
> ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION AGAINST 
) DEFENDANTS MIGUEL DAVID 
GEDO AND JAMES GEDO 
I Civil No. 01-0402488 
Judge: Steven L. Hansen 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on August 8, 2001, at 10:15 a.m., before 
the Honorable Steven L. Hansen. The Plaintiffs appeared in person and were represented by 
Brett C. Anderson of the law firm of DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. Defendants 
Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo appeared in person and were not represented by counsel. 
1 
The Court, having heard arguments of Plaintiffs' counsel and the Defendants, having heard 
evidence in support of their pleadings, and having reviewed the file in this matter, and being 
otherwise fully advised, enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs, John R. Sudweeks and Deanna Sudweeks will suffer irreparable harm 
unless this Order and Injunction issues. 
2. The threatened injury to the Plaintiffs outweighs whatever damage this Order and 
Injunction may cause Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo. 
3. This Order and Injunction will not be adverse to the public interest. 
4. Although the Court, with the limited information before it, is unable, at this point, 
to find that there is a substantial likelihood that the Plaintiffs will prevail on the 
merits of their underlying claim, the case does present serious issues on the merits 
which should be the subject of further litigation. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, and the Court, being otherwise fully advised, it is 
hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
2 
1. That Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are restrained and enjoined 
from entering Plaintiffs' real property located at: 1610 East 200 South, Pleasant 
Grove, Utah, including the thirty-three foot wide parcel which is described in 
Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Plaintiffs' Complaint which has been filed in this matter, 
and which real property is the basis of this law suit, and is referred to by the 
Records of the Utah County Recorder as: 
COMMENCING South 735.14 Feet and West 2069.64 Feet From 
the Northeast Corner of Section 27, Township 5 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; South 0* 3' 13" West .06 feet; 
South 0* 3" 14", West .07 Feet; South 89* 33' 35", West 56.38 
Feet; South 0* 36' 30 ", East 129.3 Feet; North 88* 32' 53", East .5 
Feet; South 0* 12' 47", East .18 Feet; South 88* 32' 52", West 
29.43 T; North 0* 12' 47", West 138.01 Feet; North 88* 39' 13", 
East 84.45 Feet to the Point of Beginning. Total area is 
approximately .101 acres. 
2. Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are restrained and enjoined from 
blocking or otherwise interfering with Plaintiffs' quiet use and enjoyment of the 
parcels of real property described in Paragraph 1 above. 
3. Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo are restrained and enjoined from 
contacting, annoying, harassing, harming, or otherwise communicating directly or 
indirectly with the Plaintiffs and their family members. 
3 
4. That Defendants' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is hereby denied. 
DATED this \p day o£Atigust, 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
/^Steven L. Hansen 
Steven L. Hansen 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this ^ l^day of August, 2001,1 deposited in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and Preliminary Injunction Against 
Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo, to: 
Miguel David Gedo 
361 West 800 North 
Provo, Utah 84061 
James Gedo 
361 West 800 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
j^.Y^Hb*^ 
Exhibit "K" 
Memorandum Decision-Judge Hansen 
2t002 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHNR. SUDWEEKS, and DEANNA 
SUDWEEKS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, MIGUEL 
DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, JOHNNY 
RAY O'CONNOR, and MARTHA 
O'CONNOR. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 010402488 
Date: March 20, 2002 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants5 Demand to Quash Complaint, 
Terminate Injunction, Litigation Fees, and Motion to Strike Defendants' Request for Dismissal 
Quiet Title and Request for Defense Fees The Court having reviewed all relevant memoranda, 
now grants Plaintiffs' Motions. 
Defendants Miguel David Gedo and James Gedo have submitted to the Court a Demand 
to Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction, and Award Litigation Fees In addition, Defendants 
have submitted a Request for Dismissal Quiet Title and Request for Defense Fees. Both pleadings 
are hand-written and neither of the pleadings includes a Certificate of Mailing indicating that the 
pleadings were properly served on Plaintiffs. 
Rule 10(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that all pleadings shall be 
typewritten or printed and "all typing or printing shall be clearly legible " Rule 10(f) provides that 
parties may be required to substitute properly prepared pleadings for nonconforming pleadings. 
Additionally, Rule 5(d) provides that papers filed with the court "shall be accompanied by a 
certificate of service showing the date and manner of service completed by the person effecting 
service." The Court concludes that Defendants' pleadings are illegible. As a result, 
understanding the basis of Defendants' arguments is virtually impossible. In addition, no mailing 
certificate has been filed with the Defendants' pleadings. Therefore, Defendants' Demand to 
Quash Complaint, Terminate Injunction, Litigation Fees, and Defendants' Request for Dismissal 
Quiet Title and Request for Defense Fees are stricken. Defendants' shall submit properly 
prepared pleadings. 
Plaintiffs' counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the 
Court's signature. 
DATED this day of _ JiAstU 1.2002 
BY THE COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010402488 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JAMES GEDO 
DEFENDANT 
3 61 WEST 800 NORTH 
PROVO, UT 84601 
Mail MIGUEL DAVID GEDO 
DEFENDANT 
371 East 155 South 
Or em UT 
Mail JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR 
DEFENDANT 
1640 E Battlecreek Dr 
Pleasant Grove UT 84062 
Mail MARTHA O'CONNOR 
DEFENDANT 
1640 E Battlecreek Dr 
Pleasant Grove UT 84062 
Mail MARIE ANGELICA SANCHEZ 
DEFENDANT 
371 East 155 South 
Orem UT 84061 
Mail BRETT C ANDERSON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork UT 8 4 003 
Dated this lQ day of Wlg/ch 20 02-
TtoJ ^Afnr. 
*te Deputy Court Clerk 
Paqe 1 (last) 
Exhibit "L" 
Judge Taylor order, Judge Stott order 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, Statg_of Utah 
Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH SEP 2 5 2DB5 
John R. Sudweeks, et al., : 
Plaintiffs : ORDER 
vs. : Date: September 23,2003 
Maria Angelica Sanchez, et. al, : Case Number: 010402488 
Defendants : Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court upon the receipt of a pleading titled "Request for 
Change of Judge, URCP 63b," filed by the Defendants. The Plaintiff has moved to strike the 
request pursuant to Rules 12(f) and 10 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that 
the pleading is not in appropriate form and is difficult, if not impossible to read and understand. 
The Court agrees that the text of the pleading is difficult to understand. Nevertheless, Rule 63(b) 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure is clear and specific. Rule 63(b)(C)(2) states that "The judge 
against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without further hearing, enter an order 
granting the motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge." Under 
subsection (3)(A) the reviewing judge then determines the timeliness and sufficiency of the 
pleading. It is, therefore, ORDERED: 
1) the Plaintiffs motion to strike the Defendant's Request for change of Judge is denied. 
2) This matter is referred to the Honorable Gary Stott, presiding judge of the Fourth 
District Court, to determine the sufficiency of the motion and to act as may be appropriate 
Page 1 of 2 
pursuant to Rule 63, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 23rd day of September, 2 
Copies of this Order mailed to: 
Counsel for the Plaintiff: 
Brett C. Anderson 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Counsel for the Defendant: 
James Gedo (self represented) 
Maria Angelica Sanchez (self represented) 
Miguel David Gedo (self represented) 
Mailed this, <2& day of , 2003, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
KjLSl Cy-L, ^
 
Court Clerk 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH OCT I ^2003 
JOHN R SUDWEEKS and DEANNA 
SUD WEEKS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARIA SANCHEZ, MIGUEL DAVID 
GEDO, JAMES GEDO, JOHNNY RAY 
O'CONNOR, and MARTHA O'CONNOR, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 010402488 
JUDGE: GARY D STOTT 
RULING 
This Court has received the court file for the above referenced case, in which the matter 
has been referred to address the sufficiency of a motion filed by Miguel D. Gedo. 
On September 18, 2003, Mr. Gedo filed a document entitled Request for Change of 
Judge, URCP 63b. Mr. Gedo is pro se, which shall require this Court to be less inclined to 
require Mr. Gedo to fully comply with the rules of procedure than would be expected of counsel. 
However, Mr. Gedo, who has chosen to represent himself, must make a reasonable effort to meet 
the demands of rules affecting the workings of the courts and the service of judges assigned to 
cases therein. 
Mr. Gedo's motion or request does not refer to the correct rule to change or disqualify a 
judge. Rule 63A URCP does not apply to the Request for Change of Judge. "All parties . . . " 
have not joined in the motion as required by that particular provision. 
Even if this Court were to assume that the request is intended to rely on Rule 63 URCP, 
this defendant has still failed to comply with the requirements of that provision. Based upon the 
language contained in the Request, this Court is unable to understand what it is that Mr. Gedo is 
complaining of as to Judge Taylor's participation in the case, and in fact, this Court is not able to 
understand what is actually being said or asked for in the document. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the Request of Motion is deficient as to any information or 
which this Court can conclude any impropriety has occurred by Judge Taylor, or anyone else for 
that matter. Motion or Request is denied and the case is referred back to Judge Taylor for further 
proceedings. . 
DATED this ^ 7 day of 0^1^2003. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010402488 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JAMES GEDO 
DEFENDANT 
Miguel David Gedo/Maria 
Sanche 
768 East 300 North 
PROVO, UT 84604 
Mail MIGUEL DAVID GEDO 
DEFENDANT 
P 0 BOX 970002 
OREM UT 84097 
Mail MARIE ANGELICA SANCHEZ 
DEFENDANT 
371 East 155 South 
Orem UT 
Mail BRETT C ANDERSON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
110 S MAIN 
PLEASANT GROVE UT 84062 
Dated t h i s a day of Oot_ \oC\?. 
Deputy Cour 
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Exhibit "M" 
Proof of proper service upon Miguel David Gedo 
BRETT C. ANDERSON, Bar No. 8134 
GORDON W. DUVAL, Bar No. 6532 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853 
Attorney for Plaintifls 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601 
JOHN R. SUDWEEKS and 
DEANNASUDWEEKS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, 
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, 
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and 
MARTHA O'CONNOR 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: MIGUEL DAVID GEDO 
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required, within 20 days of service of this 
summons upon you, to file with the Fourth District Court clerk at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601, 
a written answer to the attached complaint and to mail a copy to the plaintiffs attorney. If you fail to do 
so, judgment by default will be taken against upon for the relief demanded in said complaint which is on 
file with the court. ^A. 
DATED this W day of May, 2001. 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
BRETT C. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Plaintifls 
SERVE DEFENDANT: 
SUMMONS 
Case No. 
R E T U R N OF S E R V I C E 
State of Utah ) 
)ss. 
County of Utah ) 
I hereby make return of service and certify: 
1. I am a person over the age of 21 years; and 
2. I served this subpoena upon the following witness listed herein at the 
address described herein by showing the original subpoena to the 
witness personally, informing the witness of its contents and delivering 
to the witness a copy of this subpoena. 
Subpoena served on: 
Date of service: 5~"—/S 0/ 
Time of Service: Q ^ ; 3rt 
-r? TSL 
Officer's Signature 
INSTRUCTIONS TO WITNESS 
To receive payment of your witness fee (1) bring this subpoena with you to court, 
(2) present the subpoena to the clerk of the court, (3) sign the witness fee book and 
payment will be issued upon proof of identification. 
Date/Time subpoena was unable to be served: 
Reason officer was unable to serve subpoena: 
BRETT C. ANDERSON, Bar No. 8134 
GORDON W. DUVAL, Bar No. 6532 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601 
JOHN R. SUDWEEKS and 
DEANNASUDWEEKS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, 
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, 
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and 
MARTHA O' CONNOR 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: JAMES GEDO 
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required, within 20 days of service of this 
summons upon you, to file with the Fourth District Court clerk at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601, 
a written answer to the attached complaint and to mail a copy to the plaintiffs attorney. If you fail to do 
so, judgment by default will be taken against upon for the relief demanded in said complaint which is on 
file with the court. . 
DATED this U_ day of May, 2001. 
DUVAL HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
BRETT C. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
SERVE DEFENDANT: 
SUMMONS 
Case No. 
R E T U R N OF S E R V I C E 
State of Utah ) 
)ss. 
County of Utah ) 
I hereby make return of service and certify: 
1. I am a person over the age of 21 years; and 
2. I served this subpoena upon the following witness listed heron at the 
address described herein by showing the original subpoena to the 
witness personally, informing the witness of its contents and delivering 
to the witness a copy of this subpoena. 
!£»,<* <£jl> CA?^J **M«) Subpoena served on: -^fi**e<; KJ=?*Z£*0 \ y /,'eu 
Date of service: ^ *~r<9~~ y/ 
Time of Service: OP~^<r 
Officer's Signature 
INSTRUCTIONS TO WITNESS 
To receive payment of your witness fee (1) bring this subpoena with you to court, 
(2) present the subpoena to the cleric of the court, (3) sign the witness fee book and 
payment will be issued upon proof of identification 
Date/Time subpoena was unable to be served: 
Reason officer was unable to serve subpoena: 
BRETT C. ANDERSON, Bar No. 8134 
GORDON W. DUVAL, Bar No. 6532 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601 
JOHN R. SUDWEEKS and 
DEANNASUDWEEKS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, 
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, 
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR, and 
MARTHA O' CONNOR 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ 
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required, within 20 days of service of this 
summons upon you, to file with the Fourth District Court clerk at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601, 
a written answer to the attached complaint and to mail a copy to the plaintiffs attorney. If you fail to do 
so, judgment by default will be taken against upon for the relief demanded in said complaint which is on 
file with the court. 
DATED this V7_ day of May, 2001 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
BRETT C. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
SERVE DEFENDANT: 
SUMMONS 
Case No. 
R E T U R N OF S E R V I C E 
State of Utah ) 
County of Utah ) 
I hereby make return of service and certify: 
1. I am a person over the age of 21 years; and 
2. I served this subpoena upon the following witness listed herein at the 
address described heron by showing the original subpoena to the 
witness personally, informing the witness of its contents and ddivering 
to the witness a copy of this subpoena. 
Subpoena served on: / ^ W ^ . —>«* <dr* *» C / ^ f r * ' So/*J 
Date of service: S^ ~' ffr ~Of 
Time of Service: 09-30 
Officer's Signature 
INSTRUCHONS TO WITNESS 
To receive payment of your witness fee (1) bring this subpoena with you to court, 
(2) present the subpoena to the clerk of the court, (3) sign the witness fee book and 
payment will be issued upon proof of identification. 
Date/Time subpoena was unable to be served: 
Reason officer was unable to serve subpoena: 
Exhibit "N" 
Notice of ex parte Communication 
/ f t * 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN R SUDWEEKS and DEANNA 
SUD WEEKS, 
Petitioner/Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
MARIA ANGELICA SANCHEZ, MIGUEL 
DAVID GEDO, JAMES GEDO, JOHNNY 
RAY O'CONNOR, and MARTHA 
O'CONNOR, 
Respondent/Defendant(s). 
NOTICE RE: EX PARTE 
COMMUNICATION 
Case #010402488 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Division 7 
THE COURT notes to the litigants in the above-entitled matter that it has received the 
attached letter from the defendants, Miguel and James Gedo. The documents are an ex parte 
communication with the Court and may not be considered by the Court unless resubmitted in 
compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, the Court is prohibited under the law 
from giving legal advice to the defendants. The subject documents have been unread and filed in 
the court file. 
Dated this November 21, 2001 <^a££$i 
STEVEN L. HANSEN 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010402488 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JAMES GEDO 
DEFENDANT 
361 WEST 800 NORTH 
PROVO, UT 84601 
Mail MIGUEL DAVID GEDO 
DEFENDANT 
371 East 155 South 
Orem UT 
Mail JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR 
DEFENDANT 
1640 E Battlecreek Dr 
Pleasant Grove UT 
Mail MARTHA O'CONNOR 
DEFENDANT 
1640 E Battlecreek Dr 
Pleasant Grove UT 
Mail MARIE ANGELICA SANCHEZ 
DEFENDANT 
371 East 155 South 
Orem UT 
Mail BRETT C ANDERSON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork UT 84003 
Mail GORDON DUVAL 
ATTORNEY PLA 
110 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
PLEASANT GROVE UT 84 062 
Dated this -^1 day of ^/W 20 0\ 
t^ %mif^ -^  
Deputy Court Clerk 
f\Jflsl~lLs |<£ ,<2oo/ 
u * 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
v. 
Defendant /pj^
 (#£) 
Civil No. 
Judge 
^4/CfeJM 
$*£- <W ^ trior CAJ*-^***-, " ^ Y*^ I ^ 
6 ^ 
7
 > 
v ^ u n 5>l,y J ^ ***** «»• * » ~ "" -
c^.>«yf-''<>~ 4^ Uu-'~>1 e*-^-) ^«^ ffv^i "*£ ^*^U 
VViC*> *<^Tu\ \A<UT\^\ ^ « . $ y * i ( n W J V -
}>Zr,/^~ 
OinJfl^r* ^y^ 
L^ W^ 
Exhibit "O' 
Deeds to Sudweeks 
JfcECQRDEfc, MAJjL, TO: 
i-5-i—2- -4 1 
• g — 
~SS y... Space Above for Recorder's Use 
9195 w no 
'IRRANTY DEED 
TrUf 1 ABSTRACT 0t 
JOSEPH BEST AND ELAINE P. BEST, h i s wife 
of Provo $ County of Utah 
, grantor s 
, State of Utah, 
hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to JOHN SUDWEEKS AND DEANNA SUDWEEKS, his wife 
as jo in t tenants and not as tenants in common with fu l l r ights of suvivorship. 
, grantee s 
of Provo , County of Utah
 f state of Utah 
for the sum of Ten dol la rs and other good and valuable considerations DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Utah County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
t 3 
- 2 
Commencing a t a point on a fence l ine on the South side of Battle Creek 
Drive. Pleasant Grove, Utah, which point i s North 89°59f West along 
the section l ine 2252.53 feet and South 722.91 feet and North 89°05' East 
7.00 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 27, Township 5 South. Range 
2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian: thence South 0°12' West 132.90 feet-
thence South B9°05! West 85.38 feet ; thence North 0°16' East 132.90 feet : 
thence North 89°05' East 85.26 tfeet t o the place of beginning. 
Subject to easements and r e s t r i c t i o n s of record. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this p.fi day of J «^vw-c , 19 "?2„ 
Signed in the presence of y^t^^i^^/L^^^A^L^L 
^ ^ ^ ^ U J ^ ^ . . . ^ ^ . ^ ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ 
,,MMi> — ' 
M; - \ ss. 
fjjtftah J 
v*%fi£y. 21st day of June , 1972 
pelfi^afflgWj^ared before me Joseph Best and Elaine P. Best, h is wife 
the signers of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that ** he y executed the 
same. / / / / / y ^ 
1
 Notary Public. 
My commission expires ..9.-2A.-73 Residing in ErJ?v_o .•-.JJ£a.tl 
* 
APPPOVPTi FflPM — TTTAH qFr,TIT?TTTF'C« mMMT^TfYW 
<,. VHE»5RECORDED,! MAIL TO: 
*rfgrt •i-i-^-
|wfc- St>ace Above for Recorder's Use 
13361 
^' h£ -o -2 W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
» ! 
r
*CYD K. CCLLIN \ ; /oiD ^ . X K L D I N S L. C0LLIKG5, K b wiry 
of rve- t County of m a h 
, grantors 
, State of Utah, 
hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to ,;0!1!< P.. SrDWi^hS AND DJAK! A L. S;J7ATEEKS, h i s 
w i f e , as j o i n t t y r a n t s v/itl ru"» • r i j l . t s of s w i ^ o r s h i p in each an i n e t a s 
t e n a n t s i n coirxor. 
, grantee s 
of Ore? > County of v tah , State of Utah 
for the sum of fer D o l l a r s a ru e t h e r jcc-i c.no V u l ' u V e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in JJt:ih County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
beg inn ing at a j :o in t on a fence l i n e en t h e South s i d e of 3 a t t J e Creek Dr ive , 
P l e a s a n t Grove, Utah, which r . c in t i s Korth S ? c 5 9 ' West a long t h e S e c t i o n 
l i n o 2252,53 f e e t and South 722.93 f ee t and Korth 89cQ5 f East 7.CO f e e t from 
the K o r t h e a s t c o r n e r of Sec t i on 27 , Township 5 South , Ran-e 2 E a s t , S a l t Lake 
Base and M e r i i i a n ; thence North 89°Oy ^ a s t a long a fence on t h e South s i d e of 
s a i d d r i v e 86 .00 f e e t : t h e n c e Scat!, ; ^ 1 3 ' West 132.90 f e e t ; t h e n c e South 89^05 ' 
-vest 86 .00 f e e t ; thence North C 0 T?' i ^ t 132.90 f ee t t o t h e p o i n t c f b e g i n n i n g . 
o b j e c t U easoi rents and r e s t r i c t i o n s of r e c o r d . 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this C 5t ^ day of . ';guct , 19 
Signed in the presence of ^^y^..^A...,^^du^^.. 
C^&£&&& $C 
..y: 
<*zt&XZ2&& 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of UTM1 
Qn'tfce, 2r;th day of Augurt ,1972 
persoilKDy*.«^)eared before me PQYD V. COLLLVGS AND Gr^Ln] ; ; ; , i . COLLTK^S. h i s wife 
th^WgWer^V m the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me tha^ f he;' executec(Hhe 
s a m e . - 6 - ^ j / / / 
My commission expires y-^jyi 
Notary i^wic. 
APPROVED FORM — UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION 
FORM lOI - WARRANTY DEED - KELLY CO . 85 W NINTH SO . SLC L-MOO 
O 
00 
Exhibit "P" 
O'Conner deed 
mMmmmammnimeemmanK* 
CTcottNO* 0?>SiWAt D^£* 
* * 
* * < & : 
OLD REPUBLIC 
£WT £4%S16 BK 35P.V PG S 5 5 
1994 Al'i 12 3a30 Ptt FEE 12.00 
MMTOED FOK DtO REPUBLIC TITLE OF UTAH 
41 * 94080042 E 
WARRANTY DEED 
Return To:. 
Cnmtet: , J J 4 P * S t 200 S o ^ h 
Pleasant Grove. Utah_-B4I&2, 
v. SUSAN S. HARDIN6ER 
»* Pleasant Grove 
CONV'iY AND WARRANT to 
, County of Utah 
grantor 
. Swte of Utah hereby 
JOHNNY RAY O'CONNOR AND MARTHA J. G'fWNOR, HUSBAND AND WIFE 
AS JOINT TENANTS 
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE C0NSIDERATI0N-
Utah 
grantee 
for the sum of 
the following described rracr of land in 
F?ate of Utsh: 
County. 
See Exhibit "A" 
WITNESS, the hand of »klerar.:«u . t'r.U 
August 
Signed in the Presence of 
. A.D. 19 94 / 
Jay of 
A/A, d^Q2dlJM&J_ 
Mjsanb. fi^rdinger o 
STATE OF UTAH. 
County of Utah 
On the / O ^ 
pervmally appeared before me 
the jifnet of th< 
My conuimjicn expires 
<t>yof August 
Susan S. Hardinger 
. A.D. 19 94 
to me that $he executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing in. ^ptwf> LkhL 
£ V £ ffLo FV&1 v / 
ENT64 6 1A BK 3 5 0 7 PG S 5 6 
E x h i b i t ah« 
BSGISjyiNQ a t a f<ipgffl eognar on the South a i d e of 200 South S t r e e t 
( B a t t l e Creek D r i v e ) , P l e a s a n t Grove, Utah, which p o i n t i e South 
89 d e g r e e s 3 5 ' 1 4 " West a l o n g the S e c t i o n l i n e 2041 .40 f e a t and 
South 729_^3JL,feet (based on the Utah S t a t e Coordinate System, 
C e n t r a l Son© and Data p u b l i s h e d by the Utah County Surveyor a s of 
January 1986) from t h e N o r t h e a s t Corner of S e c t i o n 27, Township 5 
S o u t h , Range 2 2!ast, S a l t Lake Baste and Meridian; thence South 00 
d e g r e e s 05*19 teat 137 .87 f e e t alon^f a f e n c e l i n e as d e s c r i b e d i n 
q_7gnc_e liii>^__Sojindary Agreement Rntry^No. 353 8 8 - 9 2 , Book 2966 , .. 
JPag&__4£5^ t h * :^o~^outh 89 d e g r e e s 22 ' <FGir~*iavt 82 .56 f e e t t o a 
p o i n t on a Boundary Lin* Agxaauout Entry No. _XX4JLr-&6, Book 2^75, 
Pag© 8 4 8 ; t h e n c o North 00 d e g r e e s 12 '46" Heat .along s a i d BouMary 
^a^_Agreemojat 2lSJL_l«3iu) t h e n c e South 88 dagrej8o_J^'J53B Woat 
c o n t i n u i n g a l o j a § ^ ^ i d r ^ o u n d a r y Line Agreement ]j). SOjfftej t o _a f .QBCJB 
l l m a j t h e n c e North 00 d e g r e e s 3 6 ' 3 0 " We•J^JJiTSTT'lPg.etj^o the~"3outli 
c i d c T o ^ s a i d 200 South S t r e e t ; t h e n c e North 89 degree© 33 '35" 2 a s t 
a l o n g o a i d s t r e e t fP4 . 68 f e e t ) to_ th<s point^of_-bflginiiiiigL. 
S^Jb'VV* 
£ "^ -V^ P"'' 
<?J;t f 
Exhibit "Q" 
Other county plat maps—"ghost parcel" 
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